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Register a new userHow Much Communication Resource is Needed to Run a Wireless Blockchain Network?
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Added by
Hao Xu
Publication date
2021
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Blockchain is built on a peer-to-peer network that relies on frequent communications among the distributively located nodes. In particular, the consensus mechanisms (CMs), which play a pivotal role in blockchain, are communication resource-demanding and largely determines blockchain security bound and other key performance metrics such as transaction throughput, latency and scalability. Most blockchain systems are designed in a stable wired communication network running in advanced devices under the assumption of sufficient communication resource provision. However, it is envisioned that the majority of the blockchain node peers will be connected through the wireless network in the future. Constrained by the highly dynamic wireless channel and scarce frequency spectrum, communication can significantly affect blockchains key performance metrics. Hence, in this paper, we present wireless blockchain networks (WBN) under various commonly used CMs and we answer the question of how much communication resource is needed to run such a network. We first present the role of communication in the four stages of the blockchain procedure. We then discuss the relationship between the communication resource provision and the WBNs performance, for three of the most used blockchain CMs namely, Proof-of-Work (PoW), practical Byzantine Fault Tolerant (PBFT) and Raft. Finally, we provide analytical and simulated results to show the impact of the communication resource provision on blockchain performance.
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A pair of quantum observables diagonal in the same incoherent basis can be measured jointly, so some coherence is obviously required for measurement incompatibility. Here we first observe that coherence in a single observable is linked to the diagonal elements of any observable jointly measurable with it, leading to a general criterion for the coherence needed for incompatibility. Specialising to the case where the second observable is incoherent (diagonal), we develop a concrete method for solving incompatibility problems, tractable even in large systems by analytical bounds, without resorting to numerical optimisation. We verify the consistency of our method by a quick proof of the known noise bound for mutually unbiased bases, and apply it to study emergent classicality in the spin-boson model of an N-qubit open quantum system. Finally, we formulate our theory in an operational resource-theoretic setting involving genuinely incoherent operations used previously in the literature, and show that if the coherence is insufficient to sustain incompatibility, the associated joint measurements have sequential implementations via incoherent instruments.
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