No Arabic abstract
The wide spread of unfounded election fraud claims surrounding the U.S. 2020 election had resulted in undermining of trust in the election, culminating in violence inside the U.S. capitol. Under these circumstances, it is critical to understand the discussions surrounding these claims on Twitter, a major platform where the claims were disseminated. To this end, we collected and released the VoterFraud2020 dataset, a multi-modal dataset with 7.6M tweets and 25.6M retweets from 2.6M users related to voter fraud claims. To make this data immediately useful for a diverse set of research projects, we further enhance the data with cluster labels computed from the retweet graph, each users suspension status, and the perceptual hashes of tweeted images. The dataset also includes aggregate data for all external links and YouTube videos that appear in the tweets. Preliminary analyses of the data show that Twitters user suspension actions mostly affected a specific community of voter fraud claim promoters, and exposes the most common URLs, images and YouTube videos shared in the data.
It is a widely accepted fact that state-sponsored Twitter accounts operated during the 2016 US presidential election spreading millions of tweets with misinformation and inflammatory political content. Whether these social media campaigns of the so-called troll accounts were able to manipulate public opinion is still in question. Here we aim to quantify the influence of troll accounts and the impact they had on Twitter by analyzing 152.5 million tweets from 9.9 million users, including 822 troll accounts. The data collected during the US election campaign, contain original troll tweets before they were deleted by Twitter. From these data, we constructed a very large interaction graph; a directed graph of 9.3 million nodes and 169.9 million edges. Recently, Twitter released datasets on the misinformation campaigns of 8,275 state-sponsored accounts linked to Russia, Iran and Venezuela as part of the investigation on the foreign interference in the 2016 US election. These data serve as ground-truth identifier of troll users in our dataset. Using graph analysis techniques we qualify the diffusion cascades of web and media context that have been shared by the troll accounts. We present strong evidence that authentic users were the source of the viral cascades. Although the trolls were participating in the viral cascades, they did not have a leading role in them and only four troll accounts were truly influential.
Online Social Networks represent a novel opportunity for political campaigns, revolutionising the paradigm of political communication. Nevertheless, many studies uncovered the presence of d/misinformation campaigns or of malicious activities by genuine or automated users, putting at severe risk the credibility of online platforms. This phenomenon is particularly evident during crucial political events, as political elections. In the present paper, we provide a comprehensive description of the structure of the networks of interactions among users and bots during the UK elections of 2019. In particular, we focus on the polarised discussion about Brexit on Twitter analysing a data set made of more than 10 million tweets posted for over a month. We found that the presence of automated accounts fostered the debate particularly in the days before the UK national elections, in which we find a steep increase of bots in the discussion; in the days after the election day, their incidence returned to values similar to the ones observed few weeks before the elections. On the other hand, we found that the number of suspended users (i.e. accounts that were removed by the platform for some violation of the Twitter policy) remained constant until the election day, after which it reached significantly higher values. Remarkably, after the TV debate between Boris Johnson and Jeremy Corbyn, we observed the injection of a large number of novel bots whose behaviour is markedly different from that of pre-existing ones. Finally, we explored the bots stance, finding that their activity is spread across the whole political spectrum, although in different proportions, and we studied the different usage of hashtags by automated accounts and suspended users, thus targeting the formation of common narratives in different sides of the debate.
The dynamics and influence of fake news on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election remains to be clarified. Here, we use a dataset of 171 million tweets in the five months preceding the election day to identify 30 million tweets, from 2.2 million users, which contain a link to news outlets. Based on a classification of news outlets curated by www.opensources.co, we find that 25% of these tweets spread either fake or extremely biased news. We characterize the networks of information flow to find the most influential spreaders of fake and traditional news and use causal modeling to uncover how fake news influenced the presidential election. We find that, while top influencers spreading traditional center and left leaning news largely influence the activity of Clinton supporters, this causality is reversed for the fake news: the activity of Trump supporters influences the dynamics of the top fake news spreaders.
It is a widely accepted fact that state-sponsored Twitter accounts operated during the 2016 US presidential election, spreading millions of tweets with misinformation and inflammatory political content. Whether these social media campaigns of the so-called troll accounts were able to manipulate public opinion is still in question. Here, we quantify the influence of troll accounts on Twitter by analyzing 152.5 million tweets (by 9.9 million users) from that period. The data contain original tweets from 822 troll accounts identified as such by Twitter itself. We construct and analyse a very large interaction graph of 9.3 million nodes and 169.9 million edges using graph analysis techniques, along with a game-theoretic centrality measure. Then, we quantify the influence of all Twitter accounts on the overall information exchange as is defined by the retweet cascades. We provide a global influence ranking of all Twitter accounts and we find that one troll account appears in the top-100 and four in the top-1000. This combined with other findings presented in this paper constitute evidence that the driving force of virality and influence in the network came from regular users - users who have not been classified as trolls by Twitter. On the other hand, we find that on average, troll accounts were tens of times more influential than regular users were. Moreover, 23% and 22% of regular accounts in the top-100 and top-1000 respectively, have now been suspended by Twitter. This raises questions about their authenticity and practices during the 2016 US presidential election.
Political organizations worldwide keep innovating their use of social media technologies. In the 2019 Indian general election, organizers used a network of WhatsApp groups to manipulate Twitter trends through coordinated mass postings. We joined 600 WhatsApp groups that support the Bharatiya Janata Party, the right-wing party that won the general election, to investigate these campaigns. We found evidence of 75 hashtag manipulation campaigns in the form of mobilization messages with lists of pre-written tweets. Building on this evidence, we estimate the campaigns size, describe their organization and determine whether they succeeded in creating controlled social media narratives. Our findings show that the campaigns produced hundreds of nationwide Twitter trends throughout the election. Centrally controlled but voluntary in participation, this hybrid configuration of technologies and organizational strategies shows how profoundly online tools transform campaign politics. Trend alerts complicate the debates over the legitimate use of digital tools for political participation and may have provided a blueprint for participatory media manipulation by a party with popular support.