No Arabic abstract
Point cloud is an important 3D data representation widely used in many essential applications. Leveraging deep neural networks, recent works have shown great success in processing 3D point clouds. However, those deep neural networks are vulnerable to various 3D adversarial attacks, which can be summarized as two primary types: point perturbation that affects local point distribution, and surface distortion that causes dramatic changes in geometry. In this paper, we simultaneously address both the aforementioned attacks by learning to restore the clean point clouds from the attacked ones. More specifically, we propose an IF-Defense framework to directly optimize the coordinates of input points with geometry-aware and distribution-aware constraints. The former aims to recover the surface of point cloud through implicit function, while the latter encourages evenly-distributed points. Our experimental results show that IF-Defense achieves the state-of-the-art defense performance against existing 3D adversarial attacks on PointNet, PointNet++, DGCNN, PointConv and RS-CNN. For example, compared with previous methods, IF-Defense presents 20.02% improvement in classification accuracy against salient point dropping attack and 16.29% against LG-GAN attack on PointNet. Our code is available at https://github.com/Wuziyi616/IF-Defense.
Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which poses a threat to their application in security sensitive systems. We propose a Denoiser and UPsampler Network (DUP-Net) structure as defenses for 3D adversarial point cloud classification, where the two modules reconstruct surface smoothness by dropping or adding points. In this paper, statistical outlier removal (SOR) and a data-driven upsampling network are considered as denoiser and upsampler respectively. Compared with baseline defenses, DUP-Net has three advantages. First, with DUP-Net as a defense, the target model is more robust to white-box adversarial attacks. Second, the statistical outlier removal provides added robustness since it is a non-differentiable denoising operation. Third, the upsampler network can be trained on a small dataset and defends well against adversarial attacks generated from other point cloud datasets. We conduct various experiments to validate that DUP-Net is very effective as defense in practice. Our best defense eliminates 83.8% of C&W and l_2 loss based attack (point shifting), 50.0% of C&W and Hausdorff distance loss based attack (point adding) and 9.0% of saliency map based attack (point dropping) under 200 dropped points on PointNet.
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have recently led to significant improvements in many fields. However, DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples which are samples with imperceptible perturbations while dramatically misleading the DNNs. Moreover, adversarial examples can be used to perform an attack on various kinds of DNN based systems, even if the adversary has no access to the underlying model. Many defense methods have been proposed, such as obfuscating gradients of the networks or detecting adversarial examples. However it is proved out that these defense methods are not effective or cannot resist secondary adversarial attacks. In this paper, we point out that steganalysis can be applied to adversarial examples detection, and propose a method to enhance steganalysis features by estimating the probability of modifications caused by adversarial attacks. Experimental results show that the proposed method can accurately detect adversarial examples. Moreover, secondary adversarial attacks cannot be directly performed to our method because our method is not based on a neural network but based on high-dimensional artificial features and FLD (Fisher Linear Discriminant) ensemble.
Deep learning based image classification models are shown vulnerable to adversarial attacks by injecting deliberately crafted noises to clean images. To defend against adversarial attacks in a training-free and attack-agnostic manner, this work proposes a novel and effective reconstruction-based defense framework by delving into deep image prior (DIP). Fundamentally different from existing reconstruction-based defenses, the proposed method analyzes and explicitly incorporates the model decision process into our defense. Given an adversarial image, firstly we map its reconstructed images during DIP optimization to the model decision space, where cross-boundary images can be detected and on-boundary images can be further localized. Then, adversarial noise is purified by perturbing on-boundary images along the reverse direction to the adversarial image. Finally, on-manifold images are stitched to construct an image that can be correctly predicted by the victim classifier. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms existing state-of-the-art reconstruction-based methods both in defending white-box attacks and defense-aware attacks. Moreover, the proposed method can maintain a high visual quality during adversarial image reconstruction.
Humans rely heavily on shape information to recognize objects. Conversely, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are biased more towards texture. This is perhaps the main reason why CNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Here, we explore how shape bias can be incorporated into CNNs to improve their robustness. Two algorithms are proposed, based on the observation that edges are invariant to moderate imperceptible perturbations. In the first one, a classifier is adversarially trained on images with the edge map as an additional channel. At inference time, the edge map is recomputed and concatenated to the image. In the second algorithm, a conditional GAN is trained to translate the edge maps, from clean and/or perturbed images, into clean images. Inference is done over the generated image corresponding to the inputs edge map. Extensive experiments over 10 datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms against FGSM and $ell_infty$ PGD-40 attacks. Further, we show that a) edge information can also benefit other adversarial training methods, and b) CNNs trained on edge-augmented inputs are more robust against natural image corruptions such as motion blur, impulse noise and JPEG compression, than CNNs trained solely on RGB images. From a broader perspective, our study suggests that CNNs do not adequately account for image structures that are crucial for robustness. Code is available at:~url{https://github.com/aliborji/Shapedefence.git}.
The security of object detection systems has attracted increasing attention, especially when facing adversarial patch attacks. Since patch attacks change the pixels in a restricted area on objects, they are easy to implement in the physical world, especially for attacking human detection systems. The existing defenses against patch attacks are mostly applied for image classification problems and have difficulty resisting human detection attacks. Towards this critical issue, we propose an efficient and effective plug-in defense component on the YOLO detection system, which we name Ad-YOLO. The main idea is to add a patch class on the YOLO architecture, which has a negligible inference increment. Thus, Ad-YOLO is expected to directly detect both the objects of interest and adversarial patches. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first defense strategy against human detection attacks. We investigate Ad-YOLOs performance on the YOLOv2 baseline. To improve the ability of Ad-YOLO to detect variety patches, we first use an adversarial training process to develop a patch dataset based on the Inria dataset, which we name Inria-Patch. Then, we train Ad-YOLO by a combination of Pascal VOC, Inria, and Inria-Patch datasets. With a slight drop of $0.70%$ mAP on VOC 2007 test set, Ad-YOLO achieves $80.31%$ AP of persons, which highly outperforms $33.93%$ AP for YOLOv2 when facing white-box patch attacks. Furthermore, compared with YOLOv2, the results facing a physical-world attack are also included to demonstrate Ad-YOLOs excellent generalization ability.