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Register a new userShort-Lived Forward-Secure Delegation for TLS
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Added by
Stefan More
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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On todays Internet, combining the end-to-end security of TLS with Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) while ensuring the authenticity of connections results in a challenging delegation problem. When CDN servers provide content, they have to authenticate themselves as the origin server to establish a valid end-to-end TLS connection with the client. In standard TLS, the latter requires access to the secret key of the server. To curb this problem, multiple workarounds exist to realize a delegation of the authentication. In this paper, we present a solution that renders key sharing unnecessary and reduces the need for workarounds. By adapting identity-based signatures to this setting, our solution offers short-lived delegations. Additionally, by enabling forward-security, existing delegations remain valid even if the servers secret key leaks. We provide an implementation of the scheme and discuss integration into a TLS stack. In our evaluation, we show that an efficient implementation incurs less overhead than a typical network round trip. Thereby, we propose an alternative approach to current delegation practices on the web.
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Network middle-boxes often classify the traffic flows on the Internet to perform traffic management or discriminate one traffic against the other. As the widespread adoption of HTTPS protocol has made it difficult to classify the traffic looking into the content field, one of the fields the middle-boxes look for is Server Name Indicator (SNI), which goes in plain text. SNI field contains information about the host and can, in turn, reveal the type of traffic. This paper presents a method to mask the server host identity by encrypting the SNI. We develop a simple method that completes the SSL/TLS connection establishment over two handshakes - the first handshake establishes a secure channel without sharing SNI information, and the second handshake shares the encrypted SNI. Our method makes it mandatory for fronting servers to always accept the handshake request without the SNI and respond with a valid SSL certificate. As there is no modification in already proven SSL/TLS encryption mechanism and processing of handshake messages, the new method enjoys all security benefits of existing secure channel establishment and needs no modification in existing routers/middle-boxes. Using customized client-server over the live Internet, we demonstrate the feasibility of our method. Moreover, the impact analysis shows that the method adheres to almost all SSL/TLS related Internet standards requirements.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) rely on in-network aggregation for efficiency, however, this comes at a price: A single adversary can severely influence the outcome by contributing an arbitrary partial aggregate value. Secure in-network aggregation can detect such manipulation. But as long as such faults persist, no aggregation result can be obtained. In contrast, the collection of individual sensor node values is robust and solves the problem of availability, yet in an inefficient way. Our work seeks to bridge this gap in secure data collection: We propose a system that enhances availability with an efficiency close to that of in-network aggregation. To achieve this, our scheme relies on costly operations to localize and exclude nodes that manipulate the aggregation, but emph{only} when a failure is detected. The detection of aggregation disruptions and the removal of faulty nodes provides robustness. At the same time, after removing faulty nodes, the WSN can enjoy low cost (secure) aggregation. Thus, the high exclusion cost is amortized, and efficiency increases.
Group signature is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, aiming to protect anonymity and ensure accountability of users. It allows group members to anonymously sign messages on behalf of the whole group, while incorporating a tracing mechanism to identify the signer of any suspected signature. Most of the existing group signature schemes, however, do not guarantee security once secret keys are exposed. To reduce potential damages caused by key exposure attacks, Song (ACMCCS 2001) put forward the concept of forward-secure group signature (FSGS), which prevents attackers from forging group signatures pertaining to past time periods even if a secret group signing key is revealed at the current time period. For the time being, however, all known secure FSGS schemes are based on number-theoretic assumptions, and are vulnerable against quantum computers. In this work, we construct the first lattice-based FSGS scheme. Our scheme is proven secure under the Short Integer Solution and Learning With Errors assumptions. At the heart of our construction is a scalable lattice-based key evolving mechanism, allowing users to periodically update their secret keys and to efficiently prove in zero-knowledge that key evolution process is done correctly. To realize this essential building block, we first employ the Bonsai tree structure by Cash et al. (EUROCRYPT 2010) to handle the key evolution process, and then develop Langlois et al.s construction (PKC 2014) to design its supporting zero-knowledge protocol.
-Wireless body area network(WBAN) has shown great potential in improving healthcare quality not only for patients but also for medical staff. However, security and privacy are still an important issue in WBANs especially in multi-hop architectures. In this paper, we propose and present the design and the evaluation of a secure lightweight and energy efficient authentication scheme BANZKP based on an efficient cryptographic protocol, Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) and a commitment scheme. ZKP is used to confirm the identify of the sensor nodes, with small computational requirement, which is favorable for body sensors given their limited resources, while the commitment scheme is used to deal with replay attacks and hence the injection attacks by committing a message and revealing the key later. Our scheme reduces the memory requirement by 56.13 % compared to TinyZKP [13], the comparable alternative so far for Body Area Networks, and uses 10 % less energy.
The proliferation of IoT devices in smart homes, hospitals, and enterprise networks is widespread and continuing to increase in a superlinear manner. With this unprecedented growth, how can one assess the security of an IoT network holistically? In this article, we explore two dimensions of security assessment, using vulnerability information of IoT devices and their underlying components ($textit{compositional security scores}$) and SIEM logs captured from the communications and operations of such devices in a network ($textit{dynamic activity metrics}$) to propose the notion of an $textit{attack circuit}$. These measures are used to evaluate the security of IoT devices and the overall IoT network, demonstrating the effectiveness of attack circuits as practical tools for computing security metrics (exploitability, impact, and risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of heterogeneous networks. We propose methods for generating attack circuits with input/output pairs constructed from CVEs using natural language processing (NLP) and with weights computed using standard security scoring procedures, as well as efficient optimization methods for evaluating attack circuits. Our system provides insight into possible attack paths an adversary may utilize based on their exploitability, impact, or overall risk. We have performed experiments on IoT networks to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed techniques.
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