No Arabic abstract
We propose an agent-based model of collective opinion formation to study the wisdom of crowds under social influence. The opinion of an agent is a continuous positive value, denoting its subjective answer to a factual question. The wisdom of crowds states that the average of all opinions is close to the truth, i.e. the correct answer. But if agents have the chance to adjust their opinion in response to the opinions of others, this effect can be destroyed. Our model investigates this scenario by evaluating two competing effects: (i) agents tend to keep their own opinion (individual conviction $beta$), (ii) they tend to adjust their opinion if they have information about the opinions of others (social influence $alpha$). For the latter, two different regimes (full information vs. aggregated information) are compared. Our simulations show that social influence only in rare cases enhances the wisdom of crowds. Most often, we find that agents converge to a collective opinion that is even farther away from the true answer. So, under social influence the wisdom of crowds can be systematically wrong.
It is known that individual opinions on different policy issues often align to a dominant ideological dimension (e.g. left vs. right) and become increasingly polarized. We provide an agent-based model that reproduces these two stylized facts as emergent properties of an opinion dynamics in a multi-dimensional space of continuous opinions. The mechanisms for the change of agents opinions in this multi-dimensional space are derived from cognitive dissonance theory and structural balance theory. We test assumptions from proximity voting and from directional voting regarding their ability to reproduce the expected emerging properties. We further study how the emotional involvement of agents, i.e. their individual resistance to change opinions, impacts the dynamics. We identify two regimes for the global and the individual alignment of opinions. If the affective involvement is high and shows a large variance across agents, this fosters the emergence of a dominant ideological dimension. Agents align their opinions along this dimension in opposite directions, i.e. create a state of polarization.
Wisdom of crowds refers to the phenomenon that the average opinion of a group of individuals on a given question can be very close to the true answer. It requires a large group diversity of opinions, but the collective error, the difference between the average opinion and the true value, has to be small. We consider a stochastic opinion dynamics where individuals can change their opinion based on the opinions of others (social influence $alpha$), but to some degree also stick to their initial opinion (individual conviction $beta$). We then derive analytic expressions for the dynamics of the collective error and the group diversity. We analyze their long-term behavior to determine the impact of the two parameters $(alpha,beta)$ and the initial opinion distribution on the wisdom of crowds. This allows us to quantify the ambiguous role of social influence: only if the initial collective error is large, it helps to improve the wisdom of crowds, but in most cases it deteriorates the outcome. In these cases, individual conviction still improves the wisdom of crowds because it mitigates the impact of social influence.
Pedestrians are often encountered walking in the company of some social relations, rather than alone. The social groups thus formed, in variable proportions depending on the context, are not randomly organised but exhibit distinct features, such as the well-known tendency of 3-member groups to be arranged in a V-shape. The existence of group structures is thus likely to impact the collective dynamics of the crowd, possibly in a critical way when emergency situations are considered. After turning a blind eye to these group aspects for years, endeavours to model groups in crowd simulation software have thrived in the past decades. This fairly short review opens on a description of their empirical characteristics and their impact on the global flow. Then, it aims to offer a pedagogical discussion of the main strategies to model such groups, within different types of models, in order to provide guidance for prospective modellers.
Traditional opinion dynamics models are simple and yet, enough to explore the consequences in basic scenarios. But, to better describe problems such as polarization and extremism, we might need to include details about human biases and other cognitive characteristics. In this paper, I explain how we can describe and use mental models and assumptions of the agents using Bayesian-inspired model building. The relationship between human rationality and Bayesian methods will be explored, and we will see that Bayesian ideas can indeed be used to explain how humans reason. We will see how to use Bayesian-inspired rules using the simplest version of the Continuous Opinions and Discrete Actions (CODA) model. From that, we will explore how we can obtain update rules that include human behavioral characteristics such as confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, or our tendency to change opinions much less than we should. Keywords: Opinion dynamics, Bayesian methods, Cognition, CODA, Agent-based models
In this paper, we propose a Boltzmann-type kinetic description of opinion formation on social networks, which takes into account a general connectivity distribution of the individuals. We consider opinion exchange processes inspired by the Sznajd model and related simplifications but we do not assume that individuals interact on a regular lattice. Instead, we describe the structure of the social network statistically, assuming that the number of contacts of a given individual determines the probability that their opinion reaches and influences the opinion of another individual. From the kinetic description of the system, we study the evolution of the mean opinion, whence we find precise analytical conditions under which phase transitions, i.e. changes of sign between the initial and the asymptotic mean opinions, occur. Furthermore, we show that a non-zero correlation between the initial opinions and the connectivity of the individuals is necessary to observe phase transitions. Finally, we validate our analytical results through Monte Carlo simulations of the stochastic opinion exchange processes on the social network.