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Register a new userPractical and Verifiable Electronic Sortition
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Added by
Hsun Lee
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Existing verifiable e-sortition systems are impractical due to computationally expensive verification (linear to the duration of the registration phase, T) or the ease of being denial of service. Based on the advance in verifiable delay functions, we propose a verifiable e-sortition scheme whose result can be efficiently verified in constant time with respect to T. We present the preliminary design and implementation, and explore future directions to further enhance practicability.
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Democratic principles demand that every voter should be able to individually verify that their vote is recorded as intended and counted as recorded, without having to trust any authorities. However, most end-to-end (E2E) verifiable voting protocols that provide universal verifiability and voter secrecy implicitly require to trust some authorities or auditors for the correctness guarantees that they provide. In this paper, we explore the notion of individual verifiability. We evaluate the existing E2E voting protocols and propose a new protocol that guarantees such verifiability without any trust requirements. Our construction depends on a novel vote commitment scheme to capture voter intent that allows voters to obtain a direct zero-knowledge proof of their vote being recorded as intended. We also ensure protection against spurious vote injection or deletion post eligibility verification, and polling-booth level community profiling.
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E-voting systems are a powerful technology for improving democracy. Unfortunately, prior voting systems have single points-of-failure, which may compromise availability, privacy, or integrity of the election results. We present the design, implementation, security analysis, and evaluation of the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems. We present two systems: one asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Our systems include a distributed vote collection subsystem that does not require cryptographic operations on behalf of the voter. We also include a distributed, replicated and fault-tolerant Bulletin Board component, that stores all necessary election-related information, and allows any party to read and verify the complete election process. Finally, we incorporate trustees, who control result production while guaranteeing privacy and end-to-end-verifiability as long as their strong majority is honest. Our suite of e-voting systems are the first whose voting operation is human verifiable, i.e., a voter can vote over the web, even when her web client stack is potentially unsafe, without sacrificing her privacy, and still be assured her vote was recorded as cast. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement complete prototypes, measure their performance experimentally, and demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections. Finally, we demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the t
Cloud computing offers resource-constrained users big-volume data storage and energy-consuming complicated computation. However, owing to the lack of full trust in the cloud, the cloud users prefer privacy-preserving outsourced data computation with correctness verification. However, cryptography-based schemes introduce high computational costs to both the cloud and its users for verifiable computation with privacy preservation, which makes it difficult to support complicated computations in practice. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) as a trusted execution environment is widely researched in various fields (such as secure data analytics and computation), and is regarded as a promising way to achieve efficient outsourced data computation with privacy preservation over the cloud. But we find two types of threats towards the computation with SGX: Disarranging Data-Related Code threat and Output Tampering and Misrouting threat. In this paper, we depict these threats using formal methods and successfully conduct the two threats on the enclave program constructed by Rust SGX SDK to demonstrate their impacts on the correctness of computations over SGX enclaves. In order to provide countermeasures, we propose an efficient and secure scheme to resist the threats and realize verifiable computation for Intel SGX. We prove the security and show the efficiency and correctness of our proposed scheme through theoretic analysis and extensive experiments. Furthermore, we compare the performance of our scheme with that of some cryptography-based schemes to show its high efficiency.
In the $left( {t,n} right)$ threshold quantum secret sharing scheme, it is difficult to ensure that internal participants are honest. In this paper, a verifiable $left( {t,n} right)$ threshold quantum secret sharing scheme is designed combined with classical secret sharing scheme. First of all, the distributor uses the asymmetric binary polynomials to generate the shares and sends them to each participant. Secondly, the distributor sends the initial quantum state with the secret to the first participant, and each participant performs unitary operation that using the mutually unbiased bases on the obtained $d$ dimension single bit quantum state ($d$ is a large odd prime number). In this process, distributor can randomly check the participants, and find out the internal fraudsters by unitary inverse operation gradually upward. Then the secret is reconstructed after all other participants simultaneously public transmission. Security analysis show that this scheme can resist both external and internal attacks.
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