Principal Fairness for Human and Algorithmic Decision-Making

Using the concept of principal stratification from the causal inference literature, we introduce a new notion of fairness, called principal fairness, for human and algorithmic decision-making. The key idea is that one should not discriminate among individuals who would be similarly affected by the decision. Unlike the existing statistical definitions of fairness, principal fairness explicitly accounts for the fact that individuals can be impacted by the decision. We propose an axiomatic assumption that all groups are created equal. This assumption is motivated by a belief that protected attributes such as race and gender should have no direct causal effects on potential outcomes. Under this assumption, we show that principal fairness implies all three existing statistical fairness criteria once we account for relevant covariates. This result also highlights the essential role of conditioning covariates in resolving the previously recognized tradeoffs between the existing statistical fairness criteria. Finally, we discuss how to empirically choose conditioning covariates and then evaluate the principal fairness of a particular decision.