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Quantum copy protection uses the unclonability of quantum states to construct quantum software that provably cannot be pirated. Copy protection would be immensely useful, but unfortunately little is known about how to achieve it in general. In this work, we make progress on this goal, by giving the following results: - We show how to copy protect any program that cannot be learned from its input/output behavior, relative to a classical oracle. This improves on Aaronson [CCC09], which achieves the same relative to a quantum oracle. By instantiating the oracle with post-quantum candidate obfuscation schemes, we obtain a heuristic construction of copy protection. -We show, roughly, that any program which can be watermarked can be copy detected, a weaker version of copy protection that does not prevent copying, but guarantees that any copying can be detected. Our scheme relies on the security of the assumed watermarking, plus the assumed existence of public key quantum money. Our construction is general, applicable to many recent watermarking schemes.
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Website fingerprinting attacks enable an adversary to infer which website a victim is visiting, even if the victim uses an encrypting proxy, such as Tor. Previous work has shown that all proposed defenses against website fingerprinting attacks are ineffective. This paper advances the study of website fingerprinting attacks and defenses in two ways. First, we develop bounds on the trade-off between security and bandwidth overhead that any fingerprinting defense scheme can achieve. This enables us to compare schemes with different security/overhead trade-offs by comparing how close they are to the lower bound. We then refine, implement, and evaluate the Congestion Sensitive BuFLO scheme outlined by Cai, et al. CS-BuFLO, which is based on the provably-secure BuFLO defense proposed by Dyer, et al., was not fully-specified by Cai, et al, but has nonetheless attracted the attention of the Tor developers. Our experiments find that CS-BuFLO has high overhead (around 2.3-2.8x) but can get 6x closer to the bandwidth/security trade-off lower bound than Tor or plain SSH.
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is envisioned to be one of the most challenging security problems in the coming decade. One key challenge in CIP is the ability to allocate resources, either personnel or cyber, to critical infrastructures with different vulnerability and criticality levels. In this work, a contract-theoretic approach is proposed to solve the problem of resource allocation in critical infrastructure with asymmetric information. A control center (CC) is used to design contracts and offer them to infrastructures owners. A contract can be seen as an agreement between the CC and infrastructures using which the CC allocates resources and gets rewards in return. Contracts are designed in a way to maximize the CCs benefit and motivate each infrastructure to accept a contract and obtain proper resources for its protection. Infrastructures are defined by both vulnerability levels and criticality levels which are unknown to the CC. Therefore, each infrastructure can claim that it is the most vulnerable or critical to gain more resources. A novel mechanism is developed to handle such an asymmetric information while providing the optimal contract that motivates each infrastructure to reveal its actual type. The necessary and sufficient conditions for such resource allocation contracts under asymmetric information are derived. Simulation results show that the proposed contract-theoretic approach maximizes the CCs utility while ensuring that no infrastructure has an incentive to ask for another contract, despite the lack of exact information at the CC.
Software digital rights management is a pressing need for the software development industry which remains, as no practical solutions have been acclamaimed succesful by the industry. We introduce a novel software-protection method, fully implemented with todays technologies, that provides traitor tracing and license enforcement and requires no additional hardware nor inter-connectivity. Our work benefits from the use of secure triggers, a cryptographic primitive that is secure assuming the existence of an ind-cpa secure block cipher. Using our framework, developers may insert license checks and fingerprints, and obfuscate the code using secure triggers. As a result, this rises the cost that software analysis tools have detect and modify protection mechanisms. Thus rising the complexity of cracking this system.
Deterministically integrating single solid-state quantum emitters with photonic nanostructures serves as a key enabling resource in the context of photonic quantum technology. Due to the random spatial location of many widely-used solid-state quantum emitters, a number of positoning approaches for locating the quantum emitters before nanofabrication have been explored in the last decade. Here, we review the working principles of several nanoscale positioning methods and the most recent progress in this field, covering techniques including atomic force microscopy, scanning electron microscopy, confocal microscopy with textit{in situ} lithography, and wide-field fluorescence imaging. A selection of representative device demonstrations with high-performance is presented, including high-quality single-photon sources, bright entangled-photon pairs, strongly-coupled cavity QED systems, and other emerging applications. The challenges in applying positioning techniques to different material systems and opportunities for using these approaches for realizing large-scale quantum photonic devices are discussed.
Starting from the one-way group action framework of Brassard and Yung (Crypto 90), we revisit building cryptography based on group actions. Several previous candidates for one-way group actions no longer stand, due to progress both on classical algorithms (e.g., graph isomorphism) and quantum algorithms (e.g., discrete logarithm). We propose the general linear group action on tensors as a new candidate to build cryptography based on group actions. Recent works (Futorny--Grochow--Sergeichuk, Lin. Alg. Appl., 2019) suggest that the underlying algorithmic problem, the tensor isomorphism problem, is the hardest one among several isomorphism testing problems arising from areas including coding theory, computational group theory, and multivariate cryptography. We present evidence to justify the viability of this proposal from comprehensive study of the state-of-art heuristic algorithms, theoretical algorithms, and hardness results, as well as quantum algorithms. We then introduce a new notion called pseudorandom group actions to further develop group-action based cryptography. Briefly speaking, given a group $G$ acting on a set $S$, we assume that it is hard to distinguish two distributions of $(s, t)$ either uniformly chosen from $Stimes S$, or where $s$ is randomly chosen from $S$ and $t$ is the result of applying a random group action of $gin G$ on $s$. This subsumes the classical decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption when specialized to a particular group action. We carefully analyze various attack strategies that support the general linear group action on tensors as a candidate for this assumption. Finally, we establish the quantum security of several cryptographic primitives based on the one-way group action assumption and the pseudorandom group action assumption.
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