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Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) can be viewed as an implicit estimator of a data distribution, and this perspective motivates using the adversarial concept in the true input parameter estimation of black-box generators. While previous works on likelihood-free inference introduces an implicit proposal distribution on the generator input, this paper analyzes theoretic limitations of the proposal distribution approach. On top of that, we introduce a new algorithm, Adversarial Likelihood-Free Inference (ALFI), to mitigate the analyzed limitations, so ALFI is able to find the posterior distribution on the input parameter for black-box generative models. We experimented ALFI with diverse simulation models as well as pre-trained statistical models, and we identified that ALFI achieves the best parameter estimation accuracy with a limited simulation budget.
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In general, adversarial perturbations superimposed on inputs are realistic threats for a deep neural network (DNN). In this paper, we propose a practical generation method of such adversarial perturbation to be applied to black-box attacks that demand access to an input-output relationship only. Thus, the attackers generate such perturbation without invoking inner functions and/or accessing the inner states of a DNN. Unlike the earlier studies, the algorithm to generate the perturbation presented in this study requires much fewer query trials. Moreover, to show the effectiveness of the adversarial perturbation extracted, we experiment with a DNN for semantic segmentation. The result shows that the network is easily deceived with the perturbation generated than using uniformly distributed random noise with the same magnitude.
We demonstrate that model-based derivative free optimisation algorithms can generate adversarial targeted misclassification of deep networks using fewer network queries than non-model-based methods. Specifically, we consider the black-box setting, and show that the number of networks queries is less impacted by making the task more challenging either through reducing the allowed $ell^{infty}$ perturbation energy or training the network with defences against adversarial misclassification. We illustrate this by contrasting the BOBYQA algorithm with the state-of-the-art model-free adversarial targeted misclassification approaches based on genetic, combinatorial, and direct-search algorithms. We observe that for high $ell^{infty}$ energy perturbations on networks, the aforementioned simpler model-free methods require the fewest queries. In contrast, the proposed BOBYQA based method achieves state-of-the-art results when the perturbation energy decreases, or if the network is trained against adversarial perturbations.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated excellent performance on various tasks, however they are under the risk of adversarial examples that can be easily generated when the target model is accessible to an attacker (white-box setting). As plenty of machine learning models have been deployed via online services that only provide query outputs from inaccessible models (e.g. Google Cloud Vision API2), black-box adversarial attacks (inaccessible target model) are of critical security concerns in practice rather than white-box ones. However, existing query-based black-box adversarial attacks often require excessive model queries to maintain a high attack success rate. Therefore, in order to improve query efficiency, we explore the distribution of adversarial examples around benign inputs with the help of image structure information characterized by a Neural Process, and propose a Neural Process based black-box adversarial attack (NP-Attack) in this paper. Extensive experiments show that NP-Attack could greatly decrease the query counts under the black-box setting.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. These are examples that have undergone small, carefully crafted perturbations, and which can easily fool a DNN into making misclassifications at test time. Thus far, the field of adversarial research has mainly focused on image models, under either a white-box setting, where an adversary has full access to model parameters, or a black-box setting where an adversary can only query the target model for probabilities or labels. Whilst several white-box attacks have been proposed for video models, black-box video attacks are still unexplored. To close this gap, we propose the first black-box video attack framework, called V-BAD. V-BAD utilizes tentative perturbations transferred from image models, and partition-based rectifications found by the NES on partitions (patches) of tentative perturbations, to obtain good adversarial gradient estimates with fewer queries to the target model. V-BAD is equivalent to estimating the projection of an adversarial gradient on a selected subspace. Using three benchmark video datasets, we demonstrate that V-BAD can craft both untargeted and targeted attacks to fool two state-of-the-art deep video recognition models. For the targeted attack, it achieves $>$93% success rate using only an average of $3.4 sim 8.4 times 10^4$ queries, a similar number of queries to state-of-the-art black-box image attacks. This is despite the fact that videos often have two orders of magnitude higher dimensionality than static images. We believe that V-BAD is a promising new tool to evaluate and improve the robustness of video recognition models to black-box adversarial attacks.
Machine learning models, especially neural network (NN) classifiers, have acceptable performance and accuracy that leads to their wide adoption in different aspects of our daily lives. The underlying assumption is that these models are generated and used in attack free scenarios. However, it has been shown that neural network based classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are inputs with special perturbations that are ignored by human eyes while can mislead NN classifiers. Most of the existing methods for generating such perturbations require a certain level of knowledge about the target classifier, which makes them not very practical. For example, some generators require knowledge of pre-softmax logits while others utilize prediction scores. In this paper, we design a practical black-box adversarial example generator, dubbed ManiGen. ManiGen does not require any knowledge of the inner state of the target classifier. It generates adversarial examples by searching along the manifold, which is a concise representation of input data. Through extensive set of experiments on different datasets, we show that (1) adversarial examples generated by ManiGen can mislead standalone classifiers by being as successful as the state-of-the-art white-box generator, Carlini, and (2) adversarial examples generated by ManiGen can more effectively attack classifiers with state-of-the-art defenses.
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