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Register a new userGroup Membership Verification with Privacy: Sparse or Dense?
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Added by
Marzieh Gheisari
Publication date
2020
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Group membership verification checks if a biometric trait corresponds to one member of a group without revealing the identity of that member. Recent contributions provide privacy for group membership protocols through the joint use of two mechanisms: quantizing templates into discrete embeddings and aggregating several templates into one group representation. However, this scheme has one drawback: the data structure representing the group has a limited size and cannot recognize noisy queries when many templates are aggregated. Moreover, the sparsity of the embeddings seemingly plays a crucial role on the performance verification. This paper proposes a mathematical model for group membership verification allowing to reveal the impact of sparsity on both security, compactness, and verification performances. This model bridges the gap towards a Bloom filter robust to noisy queries. It shows that a dense solution is more competitive unless the queries are almost noiseless.
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When convoking privacy, group membership verification checks if a biometric trait corresponds to one member of a group without revealing the identity of that member. Similarly, group membership identification states which group the individual belongs to, without knowing his/her identity. A recent contribution provides privacy and security for group membership protocols through the joint use of two mechanisms: quantizing biometric templates into discrete embeddings and aggregating several templates into one group representation. This paper significantly improves that contribution because it jointly learns how to embed and aggregate instead of imposing fixed and hard coded rules. This is demonstrated by exposing the mathematical underpinnings of the learning stage before showing the improvements through an extensive series of experiments targeting face recognition. Overall, experiments show that learning yields an excellent trade-off between security /privacy and verification /identification performances.
This paper proposes a group membership verification protocol preventing the curious but honest server from reconstructing the enrolled signatures and inferring the identity of querying clients. The protocol quantizes the signatures into discrete embeddings, making reconstruction difficult. It also aggregates multiple embeddings into representative values, impeding identification. Theoretical and experimental results show the trade-off between the security and the error rates.
With the emergence of cloud computing services, computationally weak devices (Clients) can delegate expensive tasks to more powerful entities (Servers). This raises the question of verifying a result at a lower cost than that of recomputing it. This verification can be private, between the Client and the Server, or public, when the result can be verified by any third party. We here present protocols for the verification of matrix-vector multiplications, that are secure against malicious Servers. The obtained algorithms are essentially optimal in the amortized model: the overhead for the Server is limited to a very small constant factor, even in the sparse or structured matrix case; and the computational time for the public Verifier is linear in the dimension. Our protocols combine probabilistic checks and cryptographic operations, but minimize the latter to preserve practical efficiency. Therefore our protocols are overall more than two orders of magnitude faster than existing ones.
Machine learning models are increasingly made available to the masses through public query interfaces. Recent academic work has demonstrated that malicious users who can query such models are able to infer sensitive information about records within the training data. Differential privacy can thwart such attacks, but not all models can be readily trained to achieve this guarantee or to achieve it with acceptable utility loss. As a result, if a model is trained without differential privacy guarantee, little is known or can be said about the privacy risk of releasing it. In this work, we investigate and analyze membership attacks to understand why and how they succeed. Based on this understanding, we propose Differential Training Privacy (DTP), an empirical metric to estimate the privacy risk of publishing a classier when methods such as differential privacy cannot be applied. DTP is a measure of a classier with respect to its training dataset, and we show that calculating DTP is efficient in many practical cases. We empirically validate DTP using state-of-the-art machine learning models such as neural networks trained on real-world datasets. Our results show that DTP is highly predictive of the success of membership attacks and therefore reducing DTP also reduces the privacy risk. We advocate for DTP to be used as part of the decision-making process when considering publishing a classifier. To this end, we also suggest adopting the DTP-1 hypothesis: if a classifier has a DTP value above 1, it should not be published.
Membership inference attacks seek to infer the membership of individual training instances of a privately trained model. This paper presents a membership privacy analysis and evaluation system, called MPLens, with three unique contributions. First, through MPLens, we demonstrate how membership inference attack methods can be leveraged in adversarial machine learning. Second, through MPLens, we highlight how the vulnerability of pre-trained models under membership inference attack is not uniform across all classes, particularly when the training data itself is skewed. We show that risk from membership inference attacks is routinely increased when models use skewed training data. Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of differential privacy as a mitigation technique against membership inference attacks. We discuss the trade-offs of implementing such a mitigation strategy with respect to the model complexity, the learning task complexity, the dataset complexity and the privacy parameter settings. Our empirical results reveal that (1) minority groups within skewed datasets display increased risk for membership inference and (2) differential privacy presents many challenging trade-offs as a mitigation technique to membership inference risk.
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