Non-malleable codes protect against an adversary who can tamper with the coded message by using a tampering function in a specified function family, guaranteeing that the tampering result will only depend on the chosen function and not the coded message. The codes have been motivated for providing protection against tampering with hardware that stores the secret cryptographic keys, and have found significant attention in cryptography. Traditional Shannon model of communication systems assumes the communication channel is perfectly known to the transmitter and the receiver. Arbitrary Varying Channels (AVCs) remove this assumption and have been used to model adversarially controlled channels. Transmission over these channels has been originally studied with the goal of recovering the sent message, and more recently with the goal of detecting tampering with the sent messages. In this paper we introduce non-malleability as the protection goal of message transmission over these channels, and study binary (discrete memoryless) AVCs where possible tampering is modelled by the set of channel states. Our main result is that non-malleability for these channels is achievable at a rate asymptotically approaching 1. We also consider the setting of an AVC with a special state s*, and the additional requirement that the message must be recoverable if s* is applied to all the transmitted bits. We give the outline of a message encoding scheme that in addition to non-malleability, can provide recovery for all s* channel.
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