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Register a new userEncrypted DNS --> Privacy? A Traffic Analysis Perspective
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Sandra Siby
Publication date
2019
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Virtually every connection to an Internet service is preceded by a DNS lookup which is performed without any traffic-level protection, thus enabling manipulation, redirection, surveillance, and censorship. To address these issues, large organizations such as Google and Cloudflare are deploying recently standardized protocols that encrypt DNS traffic between end users and recursive resolvers such as DNS-over-TLS (DoT) and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH). In this paper, we examine whether encrypting DNS traffic can protect users from traffic analysis-based monitoring and censoring. We propose a novel feature set to perform the attacks, as those used to attack HTTPS or Tor traffic are not suitable for DNS characteristics. We show that traffic analysis enables the identification of domains with high accuracy in closed and open world settings, using 124 times less data than attacks on HTTPS flows. We find that factors such as location, resolver, platform, or client do mitigate the attacks performance but they are far from completely stopping them. Our results indicate that DNS-based censorship is still possible on encrypted DNS traffic. In fact, we demonstrate that the standardized padding schemes are not effective. Yet, Tor -- which does not effectively mitigate traffic analysis attacks on web traffic -- is a good defense against DoH traffic analysis.
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Traffic inspection is a fundamental building block of many security solutions today. For example, to prevent the leakage or exfiltration of confidential insider information, as well as to block malicious traffic from entering the network, most enterprises today operate intrusion detection and prevention systems that inspect traffic. However, the state-of-the-art inspection systems do not reflect well the interests of the different involved autonomous roles. For example, employees in an enterprise, or a company outsourcing its network management to a specialized third party, may require that their traffic remains confidential, even from the system administrator. Moreover, the rules used by the intrusion detection system, or more generally the configuration of an online or offline anomaly detection engine, may be provided by a third party, e.g., a security research firm, and can hence constitute a critical business asset which should be kept confidential. Today, it is often believed that accounting for these additional requirements is impossible, as they contradict efficiency and effectiveness. We in this paper explore a novel approach, called Privacy Preserving Inspection (PRI), which provides a solution to this problem, by preserving privacy of traffic inspection and confidentiality of inspection rules and configurations, and e.g., also supports the flexible installation of additional Data Leak Prevention (DLP) rules specific to the company.
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