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Register a new userHessian-Aware Zeroth-Order Optimization for Black-Box Adversarial Attack
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Added by
Haishan Ye
Publication date
2018
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Zeroth-order optimization is an important research topic in machine learning. In recent years, it has become a key tool in black-box adversarial attack to neural network based image classifiers. However, existing zeroth-order optimization algorithms rarely extract second-order information of the model function. In this paper, we utilize the second-order information of the objective function and propose a novel textit{Hessian-aware zeroth-order algorithm} called texttt{ZO-HessAware}. Our theoretical result shows that texttt{ZO-HessAware} has an improved zeroth-order convergence rate and query complexity under structured Hessian approximation, where we propose a few approximation methods for estimating Hessian. Our empirical studies on the black-box adversarial attack problem validate that our algorithm can achieve improved success rates with a lower query complexity.
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The adaptive momentum method (AdaMM), which uses past gradients to update descent directions and learning rates simultaneously, has become one of the most popular first-order optimization methods for solving machine learning problems. However, AdaMM is not suited for solving black-box optimization problems, where explicit gradient forms are difficult or infeasible to obtain. In this paper, we propose a zeroth-order AdaMM (ZO-AdaMM) algorithm, that generalizes AdaMM to the gradient-free regime. We show that the convergence rate of ZO-AdaMM for both convex and nonconvex optimization is roughly a factor of $O(sqrt{d})$ worse than that of the first-order AdaMM algorithm, where $d$ is problem size. In particular, we provide a deep understanding on why Mahalanobis distance matters in convergence of ZO-AdaMM and other AdaMM-type methods. As a byproduct, our analysis makes the first step toward understanding adaptive learning rate methods for nonconvex constrained optimization. Furthermore, we demonstrate two applications, designing per-image and universal adversarial attacks from black-box neural networks, respectively. We perform extensive experiments on ImageNet and empirically show that ZO-AdaMM converges much faster to a solution of high accuracy compared with $6$ state-of-the-art ZO optimization methods.
Recent studies have shown that adversarial examples in state-of-the-art image classifiers trained by deep neural networks (DNN) can be easily generated when the target model is transparent to an attacker, known as the white-box setting. However, when attacking a deployed machine learning service, one can only acquire the input-output correspondences of the target model; this is the so-called black-box attack setting. The major drawback of existing black-box attacks is the need for excessive model queries, which may give a false sense of model robustness due to inefficient query designs. To bridge this gap, we propose a generic framework for query-efficient black-box attacks. Our framework, AutoZOOM, which is short for Autoencoder-based Zeroth Order Optimization Method, has two novel building blocks towards efficient black-box attacks: (i) an adaptive random gradient estimation strategy to balance query counts and distortion, and (ii) an autoencoder that is either trained offline with unlabeled data or a bilinear resizing operation for attack acceleration. Experimental results suggest that, by applying AutoZOOM to a state-of-the-art black-box attack (ZOO), a significant reduction in model queries can be achieved without sacrificing the attack success rate and the visual quality of the resulting adversarial examples. In particular, when compared to the standard ZOO method, AutoZOOM can consistently reduce the mean query counts in finding successful adversarial examples (or reaching the same distortion level) by at least 93% on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets, leading to novel insights on adversarial robustness.
Nowadays, digital facial content manipulation has become ubiquitous and realistic with the success of generative adversarial networks (GANs), making face recognition (FR) systems suffer from unprecedented security concerns. In this paper, we investigate and introduce a new type of adversarial attack to evade FR systems by manipulating facial content, called textbf{underline{a}dversarial underline{mor}phing underline{a}ttack} (a.k.a. Amora). In contrast to adversarial noise attack that perturbs pixel intensity values by adding human-imperceptible noise, our proposed adversarial morphing attack works at the semantic level that perturbs pixels spatially in a coherent manner. To tackle the black-box attack problem, we devise a simple yet effective joint dictionary learning pipeline to obtain a proprietary optical flow field for each attack. Our extensive evaluation on two popular FR systems demonstrates the effectiveness of our adversarial morphing attack at various levels of morphing intensity with smiling facial expression manipulations. Both open-set and closed-set experimental results indicate that a novel black-box adversarial attack based on local deformation is possible, and is vastly different from additive noise attacks. The findings of this work potentially pave a new research direction towards a more thorough understanding and investigation of image-based adversarial attacks and defenses.
Deep neural networks are powerful and popular learning models that achieve state-of-the-art pattern recognition performance on many computer vision, speech, and language processing tasks. However, these networks have also been shown susceptible to carefully crafted adversarial perturbations which force misclassification of the inputs. Adversarial examples enable adversaries to subvert the expected system behavior leading to undesired consequences and could pose a security risk when these systems are deployed in the real world. In this work, we focus on deep convolutional neural networks and demonstrate that adversaries can easily craft adversarial examples even without any internal knowledge of the target network. Our attacks treat the network as an oracle (black-box) and only assume that the output of the network can be observed on the probed inputs. Our first attack is based on a simple idea of adding perturbation to a randomly selected single pixel or a small set of them. We then improve the effectiveness of this attack by carefully constructing a small set of pixels to perturb by using the idea of greedy local-search. Our proposed attacks also naturally extend to a stronger notion of misclassification. Our extensive experimental results illustrate that even these elementary attacks can reveal a deep neural networks vulnerabilities. The simplicity and effectiveness of our proposed schemes mean that they could serve as a litmus test for designing robust networks.
Powerful adversarial attack methods are vital for understanding how to construct robust deep neural networks (DNNs) and for thoroughly testing defense techniques. In this paper, we propose a black-box adversarial attack algorithm that can defeat both vanilla DNNs and those generated by various defense techniques developed recently. Instead of searching for an optimal adversarial example for a benign input to a targeted DNN, our algorithm finds a probability density distribution over a small region centered around the input, such that a sample drawn from this distribution is likely an adversarial example, without the need of accessing the DNNs internal layers or weights. Our approach is universal as it can successfully attack different neural networks by a single algorithm. It is also strong; according to the testing against 2 vanilla DNNs and 13 defended ones, it outperforms state-of-the-art black-box or white-box attack methods for most test cases. Additionally, our results reveal that adversarial training remains one of the best defense techniques, and the adversarial examples are not as transferable across defended DNNs as them across vanilla DNNs.
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