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Register a new userHow Secure are Multicarrier Communication Systems Against Signal Exploitation Attacks?
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Added by
Alireza Nooraiepour
Publication date
2018
fields
Electronic Engineering
and research's language is
English
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In this paper, robustness of non-contiguous orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (NC-OFDM) transmissions is investigated and contrasted to OFDM transmissions for fending off signal exploitation attacks. In contrast to ODFM transmissions, NC-OFDM transmissions take place over a subset of active subcarriers to either avoid incumbent transmissions or for strategic considerations. A point-to-point communication system is considered in this paper in the presence of an adversary (exploiter) that aims to infer transmission parameters (e.g., the subset of active subcarriers and duration of the signal) using a deep neural network (DNN). This method has been proposed since the existing methods for exploitation, which are based on cyclostationary analysis, have been shown to have limited success in NC-OFDM systems. A good estimation of the transmission parameters allows the adversary to transmit spurious data and attack the legitimate receiver. Simulation results show that the DNN can infer the transmit parameters of OFDM signals with very good accuracy. However, NC-OFDM with fully random selection of active subcarriers makes it difficult for the adversary to exploit the waveform and thus for the receiver to be affected by the spurious data. Moreover, the more structured the set of active subcarriers selected by the transmitter is, the easier it is for the adversary to infer the transmission parameters and attack the receiver using a DNN.
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In this paper, power allocation is examined for the coexistence of a radar and a communication system that employ multicarrier waveforms. We propose two designs for the considered spectrum sharing problem by maximizing the output signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the radar receiver while maintaining certain communication throughput and power constraints. The first is a joint design where the subchannel powers of both the radar and communication systems are jointly optimized. Since the resulting problem is highly nonconvex, we introduce a reformulation by combining the power variables of both systems into a single stacked variable, which allows us to bypass a conventional computationally intensive alternating optimization procedure. The resulting problem is then solved via a quadratic transform method along with a sequential convex programming (SCP) technique. The second is a unilateral design which optimizes the radar transmission power with fixed communication power. The unilateral design is suitable for cases where the communication system pre-exists while the radar occasionally joins the channel as a secondary user. The problem is solved by a Taylor expansion based iterative SCP procedure. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed joint and unilateral designs in comparison with a subcarrier allocation based method.
This paper presents channel-aware adversarial attacks against deep learning-based wireless signal classifiers. There is a transmitter that transmits signals with different modulation types. A deep neural network is used at each receiver to classify its over-the-air received signals to modulation types. In the meantime, an adversary transmits an adversarial perturbation (subject to a power budget) to fool receivers into making errors in classifying signals that are received as superpositions of transmitted signals and adversarial perturbations. First, these evasion attacks are shown to fail when channels are not considered in designing adversarial perturbations. Then, realistic attacks are presented by considering channel effects from the adversary to each receiver. After showing that a channel-aware attack is selective (i.e., it affects only the receiver whose channel is considered in the perturbation design), a broadcast adversarial attack is presented by crafting a common adversarial perturbation to simultaneously fool classifiers at different receivers. The major vulnerability of modulation classifiers to over-the-air adversarial attacks is shown by accounting for different levels of information available about the channel, the transmitter input, and the classifier model. Finally, a certified defense based on randomized smoothing that augments training data with noise is introduced to make the modulation classifier robust to adversarial perturbations.
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices that are limited in power and processing are susceptible to physical layer (PHY) spoofing (signal exploitation) attacks owing to their inability to implement a full-blown protocol stack for security. The overwhelming adoption of multicarrier techniques such as orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) for the PHY layer makes IoT devices further vulnerable to PHY spoofing attacks. These attacks which aim at injecting bogus/spurious data into the receiver, involve inferring transmission parameters and finding PHY characteristics of the transmitted signals so as to spoof the received signal. Non-contiguous (NC) OFDM systems have been argued to have low probability of exploitation (LPE) characteristics against classic attacks based on cyclostationary analysis, and the corresponding PHY has been deemed to be secure. However, with the advent of machine learning (ML) algorithms, adversaries can devise data-driven attacks to compromise such systems. It is in this vein that PHY spoofing performance of adversaries equipped with supervised and unsupervised ML tools are investigated in this paper. The supervised ML approach is based on deep neural networks (DNN) while the unsupervised one employs variational autoencoders (VAEs). In particular, VAEs are shown to be capable of learning representations from NC-OFDM signals related to their PHY characteristics such as frequency pattern and modulation scheme, which are useful for PHY spoofing. In addition, a new metric based on the disentanglement principle is proposed to measure the quality of such learned representations. Simulation results demonstrate that the performance of the spoofing adversaries highly depends on the subcarriers allocation patterns. Particularly, it is shown that utilizing a random subcarrier occupancy pattern secures NC-OFDM systems against ML-based attacks.
We consider a wireless communication system that consists of a background emitter, a transmitter, and an adversary. The transmitter is equipped with a deep neural network (DNN) classifier for detecting the ongoing transmissions from the background emitter and transmits a signal if the spectrum is idle. Concurrently, the adversary trains its own DNN classifier as the surrogate model by observing the spectrum to detect the ongoing transmissions of the background emitter and generate adversarial attacks to fool the transmitter into misclassifying the channel as idle. This surrogate model may differ from the transmitters classifier significantly because the adversary and the transmitter experience different channels from the background emitter and therefore their classifiers are trained with different distributions of inputs. This system model may represent a setting where the background emitter is a primary user, the transmitter is a secondary user, and the adversary is trying to fool the secondary user to transmit even though the channel is occupied by the primary user. We consider different topologies to investigate how different surrogate models that are trained by the adversary (depending on the differences in channel effects experienced by the adversary) affect the performance of the adversarial attack. The simulation results show that the surrogate models that are trained with different distributions of channel-induced inputs severely limit the attack performance and indicate that the transferability of adversarial attacks is neither readily available nor straightforward to achieve since surrogate models for wireless applications may significantly differ from the target model depending on channel effects.
This paper considers a secure multigroup multicast multiple-input single-output (MISO) communication system aided by an intelligent reflecting surface (IRS). Specifically, we aim to minimize the transmit power at the Alice via jointly optimizing the transmit beamformer, AN vector and phase shifts at the IRS subject to the secrecy rate constraints as well as the unit modulus constraints of IRS phase shifts. However, the optimization problem is non-convex and directly solving it is intractable. To tackle the optimization problem, we first transform it into a semidefinite relaxation (SDR) problem, and then alternately update the transmit beamformer and AN matrix as well as the phase shifts at the IRS. In order to reduce the high computational complexity, we further propose a low-complexity algorithm based on second-order cone programming (SOCP). We decouple the optimization problem into two sub-problems and optimize the transmit beamformer, AN vector and the phase shifts alternately by solving two corresponding SOCP sub-problem. Simulation results show that the proposed SDR and SOCP schemes require half or less transmit power than the scheme without IRS, which demonstrates the advantages of introducing IRS and the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
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