No Arabic abstract
Linear Logic and Defeasible Logic have been adopted to formalise different features relevant to agents: consumption of resources, and reasoning with exceptions. We propose a framework to combine sub-structural features, corresponding to the consumption of resources, with defeasibility aspects, and we discuss the design choices for the framework.
Linear Logic and Defeasible Logic have been adopted to formalise different features of knowledge representation: consumption of resources, and non monotonic reasoning in particular to represent exceptions. Recently, a framework to combine sub-structural features, corresponding to the consumption of resources, with defeasibility aspects to handle potentially conflicting information, has been discussed in literature, by some of the authors. Two applications emerged that are very relevant: energy management and business process management. We illustrate a set of guide lines to determine how to apply linear defeasible logic to those contexts.
A shallow semantical embedding for public announcement logic with relativized common knowledge is presented. This embedding enables the first-time automation of this logic with off-the-shelf theorem provers for classical higher-order logic. It is demonstrated (i) how meta-theoretical studies can be automated this way, and (ii) how non-trivial reasoning in the target logic (public announcement logic), required e.g. to obtain a convincing encoding and automation of the wise men puzzle, can be realized. Key to the presented semantical embedding -- in contrast, e.g., to related work on the semantical embedding of normal modal logics -- is that evaluation domains are modeled explicitly and treated as additional parameter in the encodings of the constituents of the embedded target logic, while they were previously implicitly shared between meta logic and target logic.
Where information grows abundant, attention becomes a scarce resource. As a result, agents must plan wisely how to allocate their attention in order to achieve epistemic efficiency. Here, we present a framework for multi-agent epistemic planning with attention, based on Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL, a powerful formalism for epistemic planning). We identify the framework as a fragment of standard DEL, and consider its plan existence problem. While in the general case undecidable, we show that when attention is required for learning, all instances of the problem are decidable.
Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (HMS) present a lattice model of awareness. The HMS model is syntax-free, which precludes the simple option to rely on formal language to induce lattices, and represents uncertainty and unawareness with one entangled construct, making it difficult to assess the properties of either. Here, we present a model based on a lattice of Kripke models, induced by atom subset inclusion, in which uncertainty and unawareness are separate. We show the models to be equivalent by defining transformations between them which preserve formula satisfaction, and obtain completeness through our and HMS results.
The literature on awareness modeling includes both syntax-free and syntax-based frameworks. Heifetz, Meier & Schipper (HMS) propose a lattice model of awareness that is syntax-free. While their lattice approach is elegant and intuitive, it precludes the simple option of relying on formal language to induce lattices, and does not explicitly distinguish uncertainty from unawareness. Contra this, the most prominent syntax-based solution, the Fagin-Halpern (FH) model, accounts for this distinction and offers a simple representation of awareness, but lacks the intuitiveness of the lattice structure. Here, we combine these two approaches by providing a lattice of Kripke models, induced by atom subset inclusion, in which uncertainty and unawareness are separate. We show our model equivalent to both HMS and FH models by defining transformations between them which preserve satisfaction of formulas of a language for explicit knowledge, and obtain completeness through our and HMS results. Lastly, we prove that the Kripke lattice model can be shown equivalent to the FH model (when awareness is propositionally determined) also with respect to the language of the Logic of General Awareness, for which the FH model where originally proposed.