No Arabic abstract
We study in this paper three aspects of Mean Field Games. The first one is the case when the dynamics of each player depend on the strategies of the other players. The second one concerns the modeling of noise in discrete space models and the formulation of the Master Equation in this case. Finally, we show how Mean Field Games reduce to agent based models when the intertemporal preference rate goes to infinity, i.e. when the anticipation of the players vanishes.
We study the mean field games equations, consisting of the coupled Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. The equations are complemented by initial and terminal conditions. It is shown that with some specific choice of data, this problem can be reduced to solving a quadratically nonlinear system of ODEs. This situation occurs naturally in economic applications. As an example, the problem of forming an investors opinion on an asset is considered.
In this note, we study symmetry of solutions of the elliptic equation begin{equation*} -Delta _{mathbb{S}^{2}}u+3=e^{2u} hbox{on} mathbb{S}^{2}, end{equation*} that arises in the study of rigidity problem of Hawking mass in general relativity. We provide various conditions under which this equation has only constant solutions, and consequently imply the rigidity of Hawking mass for stable constant mean curvature (CMC) sphere.
In the present work, we study deterministic mean field games (MFGs) with finite time horizon in which the dynamics of a generic agent is controlled by the acceleration. They are described by a system of PDEs coupling a continuity equation for the density of the distribution of states (forward in time) and a Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equation for the optimal value of a representative agent (backward in time). The state variable is the pair $(x, v)in R^Ntimes R^N$ where x stands for the position and v stands for the velocity. The dynamics is often referred to as the double integrator. In this case, the Hamiltonian of the system is neither strictly convex nor coercive, hence the available results on MFGs cannot be applied. Moreover, we will assume that the Hamiltonian is unbounded w.r.t. the velocity variable v. We prove the existence of a weak solution of the MFG system via a vanishing viscosity method and we characterize the distribution of states as the image of the initial distribution by the flow associated with the optimal control.
We study first order evolutive Mean Field Games where the Hamiltonian is non-coercive. This situation occurs, for instance, when some directions are forbidden to the generic player at some points. We establish the existence of a weak solution of the system via a vanishing viscosity method and, mainly, we prove that the evolution of the populations density is the push-forward of the initial density through the flow characterized almost everywhere by the optimal trajectories of the control problem underlying the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. As preliminary steps, we need that the optimal trajectories for the control problem are unique (at least for a.e. starting points) and that the optimal controls can be expressed in terms of the horizontal gradient of the value function.
In this note we prove the uniqueness of solutions to a class of Mean Field Games systems subject to possibly degenerate individual noise. Our results hold true for arbitrary long time horizons and for general non-separable Hamiltonians that satisfy a so-called $displacement monotonicity$ condition. Ours are the first global in time uniqueness results, beyond the well-known Lasry-Lions monotonicity condition, for the Mean Field Games systems involving non-separable Hamiltonians. The displacement monotonicity assumptions imposed on the data provide actually not only uniqueness, but also the existence and regularity of the solutions.