No Arabic abstract
Recently, a chaotic image encryption algorithm based on information entropy (IEAIE) was proposed. This paper scrutinizes the security properties of the algorithm and evaluates the validity of the used quantifiable security metrics. When the round number is only one, the equivalent secret key of every basic operation of IEAIE can be recovered with a differential attack separately. Some common insecurity problems in the field of chaotic image encryption are found in IEAIE, e.g. the short orbits of the digital chaotic system and the invalid sensitivity mechanism built on information entropy of the plain image. Even worse, each security metric is questionable, which undermines the security credibility of IEAIE. Hence, IEAIE can only serve as a counterexample for illustrating common pitfalls in designing secure communication method for image data.
Recently, an image block encryption algorithm was proposed based on some well-known chaotic maps. The authors claim that the encryption algorithm achieves enough security level and high encryption speed at the same time. In this paper, we give a thorough security analysis on the algorithm from the perspective of modern cryptology and report some critical security defects on the algorithm. Given five chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images, the attacker can obtain an equivalent secret key to successfully decrypt the other cipher-images encrypted with the same secret key. In addition, each security metric adopted in the security evaluation on the algorithm is questioned. The drawn lessons are generally applicable to many other image encryption algorithms.
Recently, an image encryption scheme based on a compound chaotic sequence was proposed. In this paper, the security of the scheme is studied and the following problems are found: (1) a differential chosen-plaintext attack can break the scheme with only three chosen plain-images; (2) there is a number of weak keys and some equivalent keys for encryption; (3) the scheme is not sensitive to the changes of plain-images; and (4) the compound chaotic sequence does not work as a good random number resource.
This paper studies the security of an image encryption scheme based on the Hill cipher and reports its following problems: 1) there is a simple necessary and sufficient condition that makes a number of secret keys invalid; 2) it is insensitive to the change of the secret key; 3) it is insensitive to the change of the plain-image; 4) it can be broken with only one known/chosen-plaintext; 5) it has some other minor defects.
Chaotic systems have been broadly exploited through the last two decades to build encryption methods. Recently, two new image encryption schemes have been proposed, where the encryption process involves a permutation operation and an XOR-like transformation of the shuffled pixels, which are controlled by three chaotic systems. This paper discusses some defects of the schemes and how to break them with a chosen-plaintext attack.
Recently Lin et al. proposed a method of using the underdetermined BSS (blind source separation) problem to realize image and speech encryption. In this paper, we give a cryptanalysis of this BSS-based encryption and point out that it is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack. In addition, there exist some other security defects: low sensitivity to part of the key and the plaintext, a ciphertext-only differential attack, divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack on part of the key. We also discuss the role of BSS in Lin et al.s efforts towards cryptographically secure ciphers.