Subscribe to the gold package and get unlimited access to Shamra Academy
Register a new userA Fast Quantum-safe Asymmetric Cryptosystem Using Extra Superincreasing Sequences
265
0
0.0
(
0
)
Added by
Shenghui Su
Publication date
2017
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
Ask ChatGPT about the research
No Arabic abstract
This paper gives the definitions of an extra superincreasing sequence and an anomalous subset sum, and proposes a fast quantum-safe asymmetric cryptosystem called JUOAN2. The new cryptosystem is based on an additive multivariate permutation problem (AMPP) and an anomalous subset sum problem (ASSP) which parallel a multivariate polynomial problem and a shortest vector problem respectively, and composed of a key generator, an encryption algorithm, and a decryption algorithm. The authors analyze the security of the new cryptosystem against the Shamir minima accumulation point attack and the LLL lattice basis reduction attack, and prove it to be semantically secure (namely IND-CPA) on the assumption that AMPP and ASSP have no subexponential time solutions. Particularly, the analysis shows that the new cryptosystem has the potential to be resistant to quantum computing attack, and is especially suitable to the secret communication between two mobile terminals in maneuvering field operations under any weather. At last, an example explaining the correctness of the new cryptosystem is given.
rate research
Read More
At Eurocrypt99, Paillier presented a public-key cryptosystem based on a novel computational problem. It has interested many researchers because it was additively homomorphic. In this paper, we show that there is a big difference between the original Pailliers encryption and some variants. The Pailliers encryption can be naturally transformed into a signature scheme but these variants miss the feature. In particular, we simplify the alternative decryption procedure of Bresson-Catalano-Pointcheval encryption scheme proposed at Asiacrypt03. The new version is more applicable to cloud computing because of its double trapdoor decryption mechanism and its flexibility to be integrated into other cryptographic schemes. It captures a new feature that its two groups of secret keys can be distributed to different users so as to enhance the robustness of key management.
In this paper, we propose a known-plaintext attack (KPA) method based on deep learning for traditional chaotic encryption scheme. We employ the convolutional neural network to learn the operation mechanism of chaotic cryptosystem, and accept the trained network as the final decryption system. To evaluate the attack performance of different networks on different chaotic cryptosystem, we adopt two neural networks to perform known-plaintext attacks on two distinct chaotic encryption schemes. The experimental results demonstrate the potential of deep learning-based method for known-plaintext attack against chaotic cryptosystem. Different from the previous known-plaintext attack methods, which were usually limited to a specific chaotic cryptosystem, a neural network can be applied to the cryptanalysis of various chaotic cryptosystems with deep learning-based approach, while several different networks can be designed for the cryptanalysis of chaotic cryptosystems. This paper provides a new idea for the cryptanalysis of chaotic image encryption algorithm.
We illustrate through example 1 and 2 that the condition at theorem 1 in [8] dissatisfies necessity, and the converse proposition of fact 1.1 in [8] does not hold, namely the condition Z/M - L/Ak < 1/(2 Ak^2) is not sufficient for f(i) + f(j) = f(k). Illuminate through an analysis and ex.3 that there is a logic error during deduction of fact 1.2, which causes each of fact 1.2, 1.3, 4 to be invalid. Demonstrate through ex.4 and 5 that each or the combination of qu+1 > qu * D at fact 4 and table 1 at fact 2.2 is not sufficient for f(i) + f(j) = f(k), property 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 each are invalid, and alg.1 based on fact 4 and alg.2 based on table 1 are disordered and wrong logically. Further, manifest through a repeated experiment and ex.5 that the data at table 2 is falsified, and the example in [8] is woven elaborately. We explain why Cx = Ax * W^f(x) (% M) is changed to Cx = (Ax * W^f(x))^d (% M) in REESSE1+ v2.1. To the signature fraud, we point out that [8] misunderstands the existence of T^-1 and Q^-1 % (M-1), and forging of Q can be easily avoided through moving H. Therefore, the conclusion of [8] that REESSE1+ is not secure at all (which connotes that [8] can extract a related private key from any public key in REESSE1+) is fully incorrect, and as long as the parameter Omega is fitly selected, REESSE1+ with Cx = Ax * W^f(x) (% M) is secure.
Recently, it has been shown how McEliece public-key cryptosystems based on moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes allow for very compact keys compared to variants based on other code families. In this paper, classical (iterative) decoding schemes for MPDC codes are considered. The algorithms are analyzed with respect to their error-correction capability as well as their resilience against a recently proposed reaction-based key-recovery attack on a variant of the MDPC-McEliece cryptosystem by Guo, Johansson and Stankovski (GJS). New message-passing decoding algorithms are presented and analyzed. Two proposed decoding algorithms have an improved error-correction performance compared to existing hard-decision decoding schemes and are resilient against the GJS reaction-based attack for an appropriate choice of the algorithms parameters. Finally, a modified belief propagation decoding algorithm that is resilient against the GJS reaction-based attack is presented.
We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation time. The attack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not increase the error rate per se. This allows for an intercept-resend attack, where an eavesdropper transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without causing any errors. As a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated charge carriers in the detectors, increase the error rate. We have experimentally tested detectors of the system id3110 (Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify the parameter regime in which the attack is feasible despite the side effect. Furthermore, we outline how simple modifications in the implementation can make the device immune to this attack.
Log in to be able to interact and post comments
comments
Fetching comments
Sign in to be able to follow your search criteria
