No Arabic abstract
We introduce a method to infer lead-lag networks of agents actions in complex systems. These networks open the way to both microscopic and macroscopic states prediction in such systems. We apply this method to trader-resolved data in the foreign exchange market. We show that these networks are remarkably persistent, which explains why and how order flow prediction is possible from trader-resolved data. In addition, if traders actions depend on past prices, the evolution of the average price paid by traders may also be predictable. Using random forests, we verify that the predictability of both the sign of order flow and the direction of average transaction price is strong for retail investors at an hourly time scale, which is of great relevance to brokers and order matching engines. Finally, we argue that the existence of trader lead-lag networks explains in a self-referential way why a given trader becomes active, which is in line with the fact that most trading activity has an endogenous origin.
According to the leading models in modern finance, the presence of intraday lead-lag relationships between financial assets is negligible in efficient markets. With the advance of technology, however, markets have become more sophisticated. To determine whether this has resulted in an improved market efficiency, we investigate whether statistically significant lagged correlation relationships exist in financial markets. We introduce a numerical method to statistically validate links in correlation-based networks, and employ our method to study lagged correlation networks of equity returns in financial markets. Crucially, our statistical validation of lead-lag relationships accounts for multiple hypothesis testing over all stock pairs. In an analysis of intraday transaction data from the periods 2002--2003 and 2011--2012, we find a striking growth in the networks as we increase the frequency with which we sample returns. We compute how the number of validated links and the magnitude of correlations change with increasing sampling frequency, and compare the results between the two data sets. Finally, we compare topological properties of the directed correlation-based networks from the two periods using the in-degree and out-degree distributions and an analysis of three-node motifs. Our analysis suggests a growth in both the efficiency and instability of financial markets over the past decade.
We develop the optimal trading strategy for a foreign exchange (FX) broker who must liquidate a large position in an illiquid currency pair. To maximize revenues, the broker considers trading in a currency triplet which consists of the illiquid pair and two other liquid currency pairs. The liquid pairs in the triplet are chosen so that one of the pairs is redundant. The broker is risk-neutral and accounts for model ambiguity in the FX rates to make her strategy robust to model misspecification. When the broker is ambiguity neutral (averse) the trading strategy in each pair is independent (dependent) of the inventory in the other two pairs in the triplet. We employ simulations to illustrate how the robust strategies perform. For a range of ambiguity aversion parameters, we find the mean Profit and Loss (P&L) of the strategy increases and the standard deviation of the P&L decreases as ambiguity aversion increases.
Common asset holding by financial institutions, namely portfolio overlap, is nowadays regarded as an important channel for financial contagion with the potential to trigger fire sales and thus severe losses at the systemic level. In this paper we propose a method to assess the statistical significance of the overlap between pairs of heterogeneously diversified portfolios, which then allows us to build a validated network of financial institutions where links indicate potential contagion channels due to realized portfolio overlaps. The method is implemented on a historical database of institutional holdings ranging from 1999 to the end of 2013, but can be in general applied to any bipartite network where the presence of similar sets of neighbors is of interest. We find that the proportion of validated network links (i.e., of statistically significant overlaps) increased steadily before the 2007-2008 global financial crisis and reached a maximum when the crisis occurred. We argue that the nature of this measure implies that systemic risk from fire sales liquidation was maximal at that time. After a sharp drop in 2008, systemic risk resumed its growth in 2009, with a notable acceleration in 2013, reaching levels not seen since 2007. We finally show that market trends tend to be amplified in the portfolios identified by the algorithm, such that it is possible to have an informative signal about financial institutions that are about to suffer (enjoy) the most significant losses (gains).
We address the problem of optimal Central Bank intervention in the exchange rate market when interventions create feedback in the rate dynamics. In particular, we extend the work done on optimal impulse control by Cadenillas and Zapatero to incorporate temporary market reactions, of random duration and level, to Bank interventions, and to establish results for more general rate processes. We obtain new explicit optimal impulse control strategies that account for these market reactions, and show that they cannot be obtained simply by adjusting the intervention cost in a model without market reactions.
We examine the Foreign Exchange (FX) spot price spreads with and without Last Look on the transaction. We assume that brokers are risk-neutral and they quote spreads so that losses to latency arbitrageurs (LAs) are recovered from other traders in the FX market. These losses are reduced if the broker can reject, ex-post, loss-making trades by enforcing the Last Look option which is a feature of some trading venues in FX markets. For a given rejection threshold the risk-neutral broker quotes a spread to the market so that her expected profits are zero. When there is only one venue, we find that the Last Look option reduces quoted spreads. If there are two venues we show that the market reaches an equilibrium where traders have no incentive to migrate. The equilibrium can be reached with both venues coexisting, or with only one venue surviving. Moreover, when one venue enforces Last Look and the other one does not, counterintuitively, it may be the case that the Last Look venue quotes larger spreads.