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Register a new userEffects of Competition and Cooperation Interaction between Agents on Networks in Presence of a Market Capacity
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A network effect is introduced taking into account competition, cooperation and mixed-type interaction amongst agents along a generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model. It is also argued that the presence of a market capacity enforces an indubious limit on the agents size growth. The state stability of triadic agents, i.e., the most basic network plaquette, is investigated analytically for possible scenarios, through a fixed point analysis. It is discovered that: (i) market demand is only satisfied for full competition when one agent monopolizes the market; (ii) growth of agent size is encouraged in full cooperation; (iii) collaboration amongst agents to compete against one single agent may result in the disappearance of this single agent out of the market, and (iv) cooperating with two rivals may become a growth strategy for an intelligent agent.
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