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Yes. That is my polemical reply to the titular question in Travis Norsens self-styled polemical response to Howard Wisemans recent paper. Less polemically, I am pleased to see that on two of my positions --- that Bells 1964 theorem is different from Bells 1976 theorem, and that the former does not include Bells one-paragraph heuristic presentation of the EPR argument --- Norsen has made significant concessions. In his response, Norsen admits that Bells recapitulation of the EPR argument in [the relevant] paragraph leaves something to be desired, that it disappoints and is problematic. Moreover, Norsen makes other statements that imply, on the face of it, that he should have no objections to the title of my recent paper (The Two Bells Theorems of John Bell). My principle aim in writing that paper was to try to bridge the gap between two interpretational camps, whom I call operationalists and realists, by pointing out that they use the phrase Bells theorem to mean different things: his 1964 theorem (assuming locality and determinism) and his 1976 theorem (assuming local causality), respectively. Thus, it is heartening that at least one person from one side has taken one step on my bridge. That said, there are several issues of contention with Norsen, which we (the two authors) address after discussing the extent of our agreement with Norsen. The most significant issues are: the indefiniteness of the word locality prior to 1964; and the assumptions Einstein made in the paper quoted by Bell in 1964 and their relation to Bells theorem.
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Many of the heated arguments about the meaning of Bells theorem arise because this phrase can refer to two different theorems that John Bell proved, the first in 1964 and the second in 1976. His 1964 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the dual assumptions of locality and determinism. His 1976 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the unitary property of local causality. This is contrary to Bells own later assertions, that his 1964 theorem began with that single, and indivisible, assumption of local causality (even if not by that name). While there are other forms of Bells theorems --- which I present to explain the relation between Jarrett-completeness, fragile locality, and EPR-completeness --- I maintain that Bells t
Bells theorem can refer to two different theorems that John Bell proved, the first in 1964 and the second in 1976. His 1964 theorem is the incompatibility of quantum phenomena with the joint assumptions of Locality and Predetermination. His 1976 theorem is their incompatibility with the single property of Local Causality. This is contrary to Bells own later assertions, that his 1964 theorem began with the assumption of Local Causality, even if not by that name. Although the two Bells theorems are logically equivalent, their assumptions are not. Hence, the earlier and later theorems suggest quite different conclusions, embraced by operationalists and realists, respectively. The key issue is whether Locality or Local Causality is the appropriate notion emanating from Relativistic Causality, and this rests on ones basic notion of causation. For operationalists the appropriate notion is what is here called the Principle of Agent-Causation, while for realists it is Reichenbachs Principle of common cause. By breaking down the latter into even more basic Postulates, it is possible to obtain a version of Bells theorem in which each camp could reject one assumption, happy that the remaining assumptions reflect its weltanschauung. Formulating Bells theorem in terms of causation is fruitful not just for attempting to reconcile the two camps, but also for better describing the ontology of different quantum interpretations and for more deeply understanding the implications of Bells marvellous work.
There are two puzzles surrounding the Pleiades, or Seven Sisters. First, why are the mythological stories surrounding them, typically involving seven young girls being chased by a man associated with the constellation Orion, so similar in vastly separated cultures, such as the Australian Aboriginal cultures and Greek mythology? Second, why do most cultures call them Seven Sisters even though most people with good eyesight see only six stars? Here we show that both these puzzles may be explained by a combination of the great antiquity of the stories combined with the proper motion of the stars, and that these stories may predate the departure of most modern humans out of Africa around 100,000 BC.
In a recent paper, Rovelli responds to our critical assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). His main argument is that our assessment lacks merit, because we fail to understand, or cope with, the premises of his theory; instead, he argues, we judge his proposal, blinded by the preconceptions inherent to ``our camp. Here, we explicitly show that our assessment judges RQM on its own terms, together with the basic requirements of precision, clarity, logical soundness and empirical suitability. Under those circumstances, we prove false Rovellis claim that RQM provides a satisfactory, realistic, non-solipsistic description of the world. Moreover, his reply serves us to further exhibit the serious problems of the RQM proposal, as well as the failures of its author to understanding the basic conceptual difficulties of quantum theory.
Bells inequality sets a strict threshold for how strongly correlated the outcomes of measurements on two or more particles can be, if the outcomes of each measurement are independent of actions undertaken at arbitrarily distant locations. Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, predicts that measurements on particles in entangled states can be more strongly correlated than Bells inequality would allow. Whereas experimental tests conducted over the past half-century have consistently measured violations of Bells inequality---consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics---the experiments have been subject to one or more loopholes, by means of which certain alternatives to quantum theory could remain consistent with the experimental results. This chapter reviews three of the most significant loopholes, often dubbed the locality, fair-sampling, and freedom-of-choice loopholes, and describes how recent experiments have addressed them.
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