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Register a new userChosen-plaintext attack of an image encryption scheme based on modified permutation-diffusion structure
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Added by
Yu Zhang
Publication date
2015
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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Since the first appearance in Fridrichs design, the usage of permutation-diffusion structure for designing digital image cryptosystem has been receiving increasing research attention in the field of chaos-based cryptography. Recently, a novel chaotic Image Cipher using one round Modified Permutation-Diffusion pattern (ICMPD) was proposed. Unlike traditional permutation-diffusion structure, the permutation is operated on bit level instead of pixel level and the diffusion is operated on masked pixels, which are obtained by carrying out the classical affine cipher, instead of plain pixels in ICMPD. Following a textit{divide-and-conquer strategy}, this paper reports that ICMPD can be compromised by a chosen-plaintext attack efficiently and the involved data complexity is linear to the size of the plain-image. Moreover, the relationship between the cryptographic kernel at the diffusion stage of ICMPD and modulo addition then XORing is explored thoroughly.
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