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Register a new userA Public Key Cryptoscheme Using Bit-pairs and Probabilistic Mazes
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Added by
Shenghui Su
Publication date
2014
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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This paper gives the definition and property of a bit-pair shadow, and devises the three algorithms of a public key cryptoscheme called JUOAN that is based on a multivariate permutation problem and an anomalous subset product problem to which no subexponential time solutions are found so far, and regards a bit-pair as a manipulation unit. The authors demonstrate that the decryption algorithm is correct, deduce the probability that a plaintext solution is nonunique is nearly zero, analyze the security of the new cryptoscheme against extracting a private key from a public key and recovering a plaintext from a ciphertext on the assumption that an integer factorization problem, a discrete logarithm problem, and a low-density subset sum problem can be solved efficiently, and prove that the new cryptoscheme using random padding and random permutation is semantically secure. The analysis shows that the bit-pair method increases the density D of a related knapsack to a number more than 1, and decreases the modulus length lgM of the new cryptoscheme to 464, 544, or 640.
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This paper gives the definitions of an anomalous super-increasing sequence and an anomalous subset sum separately, proves the two properties of an anomalous super-increasing sequence, and proposes the REESSE2+ public-key encryption scheme which includes the three algorithms for key generation, encryption and decryption. The paper discusses the necessity and sufficiency of the lever function for preventing the Shamir extremum attack, analyzes the security of REESSE2+ against extracting a private key from a public key through the exhaustive search, recovering a plaintext from a ciphertext plus a knapsack of high density through the L3 lattice basis reduction method, and heuristically obtaining a plaintext through the meet-in-the-middle attack or the adaptive-chosen-ciphertext attack. The authors evaluate the time complexity of REESSE2+ encryption and decryption algorithms, compare REESSE2+ with ECC and NTRU, and find that the encryption speed of REESSE2+ is ten thousand times faster than ECC and NTRU bearing the equivalent security, and the decryption speed of REESSE2+ is roughly equivalent to ECC and NTRU respectively.
McNie is a code-based public key encryption scheme submitted as a candidate to the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization. In this paper, we present McNie2-Gabidulin, an improvement of McNie. By using Gabidulin code, we eliminate the decoding failure, which is one of the limitations of the McNie public key cryptosystem that uses LRPC codes. We prove that this new cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure. Suggested parameters are also given which provides low key sizes compared to other known code based cryptosystems with zero decryption failure probability.
An important problem of modern cryptography concerns secret public-key computations in algebraic structures. We construct homomorphic cryptosystems being (secret) epimorphisms f:G --> H, where G, H are (publically known) groups and H is finite. A letter of a message to be encrypted is an element h element of H, while its encryption g element of G is such that f(g)=h. A homomorphic cryptosystem allows one to perform computations (operating in a group G) with encrypted information (without knowing the original message over H). In this paper certain homomorphic cryptosystems are constructed for the first time for non-abelian groups H (earlier, homomorphic cryptosystems were known only in the Abelian case). In fact, we present such a system for any solvable (fixed) group H.
In this paper, the authors give the definitions of a coprime sequence and a lever function, and describe the five algorithms and six characteristics of a prototypal public key cryptosystem which is used for encryption and signature, and based on three new problems and one existent problem: the multivariate permutation problem (MPP), the anomalous subset product problem (ASPP), the transcendental logarithm problem (TLP), and the polynomial root finding problem (PRFP). Prove by reduction that MPP, ASPP, and TLP are computationally at least equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the same prime field, and meanwhile find some evidence which inclines people to believe that the new problems are harder than DLP each, namely unsolvable in DLP subexponential time. Demonstrate the correctness of the decryption and the verification, deduce the probability of a plaintext solution being nonunique is nearly zero, and analyze the exact securities of the cryptosystem against recovering a plaintext from a ciphertext, extracting a private key from a public key or a signature, and forging a signature through known signatures, public keys, and messages on the assumption that IFP, DLP, and LSSP can be solved. Studies manifest that the running times of effectual attack tasks are greater than or equal to O(2^n) so far when n = 80, 96, 112, or 128 with lgM = 696, 864, 1030, or 1216. As viewed from utility, it should be researched further how to decrease the length of a modulus and to increase the speed of the decryption.
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) with their trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs) provide the trust backbone for the Internet: CAs sign certificates which prove the identity of servers, applications, or users. To be trusted by operating systems and browsers, a CA has to undergo lengthy and costly validation processes. Alternatively, trusted CAs can cross-sign other CAs to extend their trust to them. In this paper, we systematically analyze the present and past state of cross-signing in the Web PKI. Our dataset (derived from passive TLS monitors and public CT logs) encompasses more than 7 years and 225 million certificates with 9.3 billion trust paths. We show benefits and risks of cross-signing. We discuss the difficulty of revoking trusted CA certificates where, worrisome, cross-signing can result in valid trust paths to remain after revocation; a problem for non-browser software that often blindly trusts all CA certificates and ignores revocations. However, cross-signing also enables fast bootstrapping of new CAs, e.g., Lets Encrypt, and achieves a non-disruptive user experience by providing backward compatibility. In this paper, we propose new rules and guidance for cross-signing to preserve its positive potential while mitigating its risks.
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