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Register a new userThe game of go as a complex network
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We study the game of go from a complex network perspective. We construct a directed network using a suitable definition of tactical moves including local patterns, and study this network for different datasets of professional tournaments and amateur games. The move distribution follows Zipfs law and the network is scale free, with statistical peculiarities different from other real directed networks, such as e. g. the World Wide Web. These specificities reflect in the outcome of ranking algorithms applied to it. The fine study of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of matrices used by the ranking algorithms singles out certain strategic situations. Our results should pave the way to a better modelization of board games and other types of human strategic scheming.
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We compare complex networks built from the game of go and obtained from databases of human-played games with those obtained from computer-played games. Our investigations show that statistical features of the human-based networks and the computer-based networks differ, and that these differences can be statistically significant on a relatively small number of games using specific estimators. We show that the deterministic or stochastic nature of the computer algorithm playing the game can also be distinguished from these quantities. This can be seen as tool to implement a Turing-like test for go simulators.
This paper explores a variety of strategies for understanding the formation, structure, efficiency and vulnerability of water distribution networks. Water supply systems are studied as spatially organized networks for which the practical applications of abstract evaluation methods are critically evaluated. Empirical data from benchmark networks are used to study the interplay between network structure and operational efficiency, reliability and robustness. Structural measurements are undertaken to quantify properties such as redundancy and optimal-connectivity, herein proposed as constraints in network design optimization problems. The role of the supply-demand structure towards system efficiency is studied and an assessment of the vulnerability to failures based on the disconnection of nodes from the source(s) is undertaken. The absence of conventional degree-based hubs (observed through uncorrelated non-heterogeneous sparse topologies) prompts an alternative approach to studying structural vulnerability based on the identification of network cut-sets and optimal connectivity invariants. A discussion on the scope, limitations and possible future directions of this research is provided.
How are people linked in a highly connected society? Since in many networks a power-law (scale-free) node-degree distribution can be observed, power-law might be seen as a universal characteristics of networks. But this study of communication in the Flickr social online network reveals that power-law node-degree distributions are restricted to only sparsely connected networks. More densely connected networks, by contrast, show an increasing divergence from power-law. This work shows that this observation is consistent with the classic idea from social sciences that similarity is the driving factor behind communication in social networks. The strong relation between communication strength and node similarity could be confirmed by analyzing the Flickr network. It also is shown that node similarity as a network formation model can reproduce the characteristics of different network densities and hence can be used as a model for describing the topological transition from weakly to strongly connected societies.
With vast amounts of high-quality information at our fingertips, how is it possible that many people believe that the Earth is flat and vaccination harmful? Motivated by this question, we quantify the implications of an opinion formation mechanism whereby an uninformed observer gradually forms opinions about a world composed of subjects interrelated by a signed network of mutual trust and distrust. We show numerically and analytically that the observers resulting opinions are highly inconsistent (they tend to be independent of the observers initial opinions) and unstable (they exhibit wide stochastic variations). Opinion inconsistency and instability increase with the world complexity represented by the number of subjects, which can be prevented by suitably expanding the observers initial amount of information. Our findings imply that even an individual who initially trusts credible information sources may end up trusting the deceptive ones if at least a small number of trust relations exist between the credible and deceptive sources.
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al. (2019) consists in building neural network architectures to find optimal auctions. We propose two conceptual deviations from their approach which result in enhanced performance. First, we use recent results in theoretical auction design (Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2018) to introduce a time-independent Lagrangian. This not only circumvents the need for an expensive hyper-parameter search (as in prior work), but also provides a principled metric to compare the performance of two auctions (absent from prior work). Second, the optimization procedure in previous work uses an inner maximization loop to compute optimal misreports. We amortize this process through the introduction of an additional neural network. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by learning competitive or strictly improved auctions compared to prior work. Both results together further imply a novel formulation of Auction Design as a two-player game with stationary utility functions.
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