No Arabic abstract
Finding an optimal key assignment (subject to given constraints) for a key predistribution scheme in wireless sensor networks is a difficult task. Hence, most of the practical schemes are based on probabilistic key assignment, which leads to sub-optimal schemes requiring key storage linear in the total number of nodes. A graph theoretic framework is introduced to study the fundamental tradeoffs between key storage, average key path length (directly related to the battery consumption) and resilience (to compromised nodes) of key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks. Based on the proposed framework, a lower bound on key storage is derived for a given average key path length. An upper bound on the compromising probability is also given. This framework also leads to the design of key assignment schemes with a storage complexity of the same order as the lower bound.
Multipath routing in WSN has been a long wish in security scenario where nodes on next-hop may be targeted to compromise. Many proposals of Multipath routing has been proposed in ADHOC Networks but under constrained from keying environment most seems ignorant. In WSN where crucial data is reported by nodes in deployment area to their securely located Sink, route security has to be guaranteed. Under dynamic load and selective attacks, availability of multiple secure paths is a boon and increases the attacker efforts by many folds. We propose to build a subset of neighbors as our front towards destination node. We also identified forwarders for query by base station. The front is optimally calculated to maintain the security credential and avail multiple paths. According to our knowledge ours is first secure multipath routing protocol for WSN. We established effectiveness of our proposal with mathematical analysis
We demonstrate, for the first time, a secure optical network architecture that combines NFV orchestration and SDN control with quantum key distribution (QKD) technology. A novel time-shared QKD network design is presented as a cost-effective solution for practical networks.
In wireless systems, neighbor discovery (ND) is a fundamental building block: determining which devices are within direct radio communication is an enabler for networking protocols and a wide range of applications. To thwart abuse of ND and the resultant compromise of the dependent functionality of wireless systems, numerous works proposed solutions to secure ND. Nonetheless, until very recently, there has been no formal analysis of secure ND protocols. We close this gap in cite{asiaccs08}, but we concentrate primarily on the derivation of an impossibility result for a class of protocols. In this paper, we focus on reasoning about specific protocols. First, we contribute a number of extensions and refinements on the framework of [24]. As we are particularly concerned with the practicality of provably secure ND protocols, we investigate availability and redefine accordingly the ND specification, and also consider composability of ND with other protocols. Then, we propose and analyze two secure ND protocols: We revisit one of the protocols analyzed in [24], and introduce and prove correct a more elaborate challenge-response protocol.
Millimeter-wave wireless networks offer high throughput and can (ideally) prevent eavesdropping attacks using narrow, directional beams. Unfortunately, imperfections in physical hardware mean todays antenna arrays all exhibit side lobes, signals that carry the same sensitive data as the main lobe. Our work presents results of the first experimental study of the security properties of mmWave transmissions against side-lobe eavesdropping attacks. We show that these attacks on mmWave links are highly effective in both indoor and outdoor settings, and they cannot be eliminated by improved hardware or currently proposed defenses.
Wireless communication enables a broad spectrum of applications, ranging from commodity to tactical systems. Neighbor discovery (ND), that is, determining which devices are within direct radio communication, is a building block of network protocols and applications, and its vulnerability can severely compromise their functionalities. A number of proposals to secure ND have been published, but none have analyzed the problem formally. In this paper, we contribute such an analysis: We build a formal model capturing salient characteristics of wireless systems, most notably obstacles and interference, and we provide a specification of a basic variant of the ND problem. Then, we derive an impossibility result for a general class of protocols we term time-based protocols, to which many of the schemes in the literature belong. We also identify the conditions under which the impossibility result is lifted. Moreover, we explore a second class of protocols we term time- and location-based protocols, and prove they can secure ND.