A game-theoretic framework is used to study the effect of constellation size on the energy efficiency of wireless networks for M-QAM modulation. A non-cooperative game is proposed in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power (and possibly transmit symbol rate) as well as the constellation size in order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its delay quality-of-service (QoS) constraint. The utility function used here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted per joule of energy consumed, and is particularly suitable for energy-constrained networks. The best-response strategies and Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed game are derived. It is shown that in order to maximize its utility (in bits per joule), a user must choose the lowest constellation size that can accommodate the users delay constraint. Using this framework, the tradeoffs among energy efficiency, delay, throughput and constellation size are also studied and quantified. The effect of trellis-coded modulation on energy efficiency is also discussed.
A game-theoretic framework is used to study the effect of constellation size on the energy efficiency of wireless networks for M-QAM modulation. A non-cooperative game is proposed in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power (and possibly transmit symbol rate) as well as the constellation size in order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its delay quality-of-service (QoS) constraint. The utility function used here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted per joule of energy consumed, and is particularly suitable for energy-constrained networks. The best-response strategies and Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed game are derived. It is shown that in order to maximize its utility (in bits per joule), a user must choose the lowest constellation size that can accommodate the users delay constraint. This strategy is different from one that would maximize spectral efficiency. Using this framework, the tradeoffs among energy efficiency, delay, throughput and constellation size are also studied and quantified. In addition, the effect of trellis-coded modulation on energy efficiency is discussed.
This paper considers a game-theoretic formulation of the covert communications problem with finite blocklength, where the transmitter (Alice) can randomly vary her transmit power in different blocks, while the warden (Willie) can randomly vary his detection threshold in different blocks. In this two player game, the payoff for Alice is a combination of the coding rate to the receiver (Bob) and the detection error probability at Willie, while the payoff for Willie is the negative of his detection error probability. Nash equilibrium solutions to the game are obtained, and shown to be efficiently computable using linear programming. For less covert requirements, our game-theoretic approach can achieve significantly higher coding rates than uniformly distributed transmit powers. We then consider the situation with an additional jammer, where Alice and the jammer can both vary their powers. We pose a two player game where Alice and the jammer jointly comprise one player, with Willie the other player. The use of a jammer is shown in numerical simulations to lead to further significant performance improvements.
This paper introduces a novel concept from coalitional game theory which allows the dynamic formation of coalitions among wireless nodes. A simple and distributed merge and split algorithm for coalition formation is constructed. This algorithm is applied to study the gains resulting from the cooperation among single antenna transmitters for virtual MIMO formation. The aim is to find an ultimate transmitters coalition structure that allows cooperating users to maximize their utilities while accounting for the cost of coalition formation. Through this novel game theoretical framework, the wireless network transmitters are able to self-organize and form a structured network composed of disjoint stable coalitions. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm can improve the average individual user utility by 26.4% as well as cope with the mobility of the distributed users.
In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, application of a repeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others packets, so that the network performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such networks cannot benefit from this strategy, as the other nodes do not depend on them. This problem is sometimes known as {em the curse of the boundary nodes}. To overcome this problem, an approach based on coalition games is proposed, in which the boundary nodes can use cooperative transmission to help the backbone nodes in the middle of the network. In return, the backbone nodes are willing to forward the boundary nodes packets. Here, the concept of core is used to study the stability of the coalitions in such games. Then three types of fairness are investigated, namely, min-max fairness using nucleolus, average fairness using the Shapley function, and a newly proposed market fairness. Based on the specific problem addressed in this paper, market fairness is a new fairness concept involving fairness between multiple backbone nodes and multiple boundary nodes. Finally, a protocol is designed using both repeated games and coalition games. Simulation results show how boundary nodes and backbone nodes form coalitions according to different fairness criteria. The proposed protocol can improve the network connectivity by about 50%, compared with pure repeated game schemes.