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Register a new userDiversification in the Internet Economy:The Role of For-Profit Mediators
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Added by
Sudhir Singh
Publication date
2007
fields
Informatics Engineering
and research's language is
English
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We investigate market forces that would lead to the emergence of new classes of players in the sponsored search market. We report a 3-fold diversification triggered by two inherent features of the sponsored search market, namely, capacity constraints and collusion-vulnerability of current mechanisms. In the first scenario, we present a comparative study of two models motivated by capacity constraints - one where the additional capacity is provided by for-profit agents, who compete for slots in the original auction, draw traffic, and run their own sub-auctions, and the other, where the additional capacity is provided by the auctioneer herself, by essentially acting as a mediator and running a single combined auction. This study was initiated by us in cite{SRGR07}, where the mediator-based model was studied. In the present work, we study the auctioneer-based model and show that this model seems inferior to the mediator-based model in terms of revenue or efficiency guarantee due to added capacity. In the second scenario, we initiate a game theoretic study of current sponsored search auctions, involving incentive driven mediators who exploit the fact that these mechanisms are not collusion-resistant. In particular, we show that advertisers can improve their payoffs by using the services of the mediator compared to directly participating in the auction, and that the mediator can also obtain monetary benefit, without violating incentive constraints from the advertisers who do not use its services. We also point out that the auctioneer can not do very much via mechanism design to avoid such for-profit mediation without losing badly in terms of revenue, and therefore, the mediators are likely to prevail.
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A mediator is a well-known construct in game theory, and is an entity that plays on behalf of some of the agents who choose to use its services, while the rest of the agents participate in the game directly. We initiate a game theoretic study of sponsored search auctions, such as those used by Google and Yahoo!, involving {em incentive driven} mediators. We refer to such mediators as {em for-profit} mediators, so as to distinguish them from mediators introduced in prior work, who have no monetary incentives, and are driven by the altruistic goal of implementing certain desired outcomes. We show that in our model, (i) players/advertisers can improve their payoffs by choosing to use the services of the mediator, compared to directly participating in the auction; (ii) the mediator can obtain monetary benefit by managing the advertising burden of its group of advertisers; and (iii) the payoffs of the mediator and the advertisers it plays for are compatible with the incentive constraints from the advertisers who do dot use its services. A simple intuition behind the above result comes from the observation that the mediator has more information about and more control over the bid profile than any individual advertiser, allowing her to reduce the payments made to the auctioneer, while still maintaining incentive constraints. Further, our results indicate that there are significant opportunities for diversification in the internet economy and we should expect it to continue to develop richer structure, with room for different types of agents to coexist.
One natural constraint in the sponsored search advertising framework arises from the fact that there is a limit on the number of available slots, especially for the popular keywords, and as a result, a significant pool of advertisers are left out. We study the emergence of diversification in the adword market triggered by such capacity constraints in the sense that new market mechanisms, as well as, new for-profit agents are likely to emerge to combat or to make profit from the opportunities created by shortages in ad-space inventory. We propose a model where the additional capacity is provided by for-profit agents (or, mediators), who compete for slots in the original auction, draw traffic, and run their own sub-auctions. The quality of the additional capacity provided by a mediator is measured by its {it fitness} factor. We compute revenues and payoffs for all the different parties at a {it symmetric Nash equilibrium} (SNE) when the mediator-based model is operated by a mechanism currently being used by Google and Yahoo!, and then compare these numbers with those obtained at a corresponding SNE for the same mechanism, but without any mediators involved in the auctions. Such calculations allow us to determine the value of the additional capacity. Our results show that the revenue of the auctioneer, as well as the social value (i.e. efficiency), always increase when mediators are involved; moreover even the payoffs of {em all} the bidders will increase if the mediator has a high enough fitness. Thus, our analysis indicates that there are significant opportunities for diversification in the internet economy and we should expect it to continue to develop richer structure, with room for different types of agents and mechanisms to coexist.
In mobile Internet ecosystem, Mobile Users (MUs) purchase wireless data services from Internet Service Provider (ISP) to access to Internet and acquire the interested content services (e.g., online game) from Content Provider (CP). The popularity of intelligent functions (e.g., AI and 3D modeling) increases the computation-intensity of the content services, leading to a growing computation pressure for the MUs resource-limited devices. To this end, edge computing service is emerging as a promising approach to alleviate the MUs computation pressure while keeping their quality-of-service, via offloading some computation tasks of MUs to edge (computing) servers deployed at the local network edge. Thus, Edge Service Provider (ESP), who deploys the edge servers and offers the edge computing service, becomes an upcoming new stakeholder in the ecosystem. In this work, we study the economic interactions of MUs, ISP, CP, and ESP in the new ecosystem with edge computing service, where MUs can acquire the computation-intensive content services (offered by CP) and offload some computation tasks, together with the necessary raw input data, to edge servers (deployed by ESP) through ISP. We first study the MUs Joint Content Acquisition and Task Offloading (J-CATO) problem, which aims to maximize his long-term payoff. We derive the off-line solution with crucial insights, based on which we design an online strategy with provable performance. Then, we study the ESPs edge service monetization problem. We propose a pricing policy that can achieve a constant fraction of the ex-post optimal revenue with an extra constant loss for the ESP. Numerical results show that the edge computing service can stimulate the MUs content acquisition and improve the payoffs of MUs, ISP, and CP.
Disasters lead to devastating structural damage not only to buildings and transport infrastructure, but also to other critical infrastructure, such as the power grid and communication backbones. Following such an event, the availability of minimal communication services is however crucial to allow efficient and coordinated disaster response, to enable timely public information, or to provide individuals in need with a default mechanism to post emergency messages. The Internet of Things consists in the massive deployment of heterogeneous devices, most of which battery-powered, and interconnected via wireless network interfaces. Typical IoT communication architectures enables such IoT devices to not only connect to the communication backbone (i.e. the Internet) using an infrastructure-based wireless network paradigm, but also to communicate with one another autonomously, without the help of any infrastructure, using a spontaneous wireless network paradigm. In this paper, we argue that the vast deployment of IoT-enabled devices could bring benefits in terms of data network resilience in face of disaster. Leveraging their spontaneous wireless networking capabilities, IoT devices could enable minimal communication services (e.g. emergency micro-message delivery) while the conventional communication infrastructure is out of service. We identify the main challenges that must be addressed in order to realize this potential in practice. These challenges concern various technical aspects, including physical connectivity requirements, network protocol stack enhancements, data traffic prioritization schemes, as well as social and political aspects.
Big data production in industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is evident due to the massive deployment of sensors and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. However, big data processing is challenging due to limited computational, networking and storage resources at IoT device-end. Big data analytics (BDA) is expected to provide operational- and customer-level intelligence in IIoT systems. Although numerous studies on IIoT and BDA exist, only a few studies have explored the convergence of the two paradigms. In this study, we investigate the recent BDA technologies, algorithms and techniques that can lead to the development of intelligent IIoT systems. We devise a taxonomy by classifying and categorising the literature on the basis of important parameters (e.g. data sources, analytics tools, analytics techniques, requirements, industrial analytics applications and analytics types). We present the frameworks and case studies of the various enterprises that have benefited from BDA. We also enumerate the considerable opportunities introduced by BDA in IIoT.We identify and discuss the indispensable challenges that remain to be addressed as future research directions as well.
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