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Register a new userDetector dead-time effects and paralyzability in high-speed quantum key distribution
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Recent advances in quantum key distribution (QKD) have given rise to systems that operate at transmission periods significantly shorter than the dead times of their component single-photon detectors. As systems continue to increase in transmission rate, security concerns associated with detector dead times can limit the production rate of sifted bits. We present a model of high-speed QKD in this limit that identifies an optimum transmission rate for a system with given link loss and detector response characteristics.
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Privacy amplification (PA) is the art of distilling a highly secret key from a partially secure string by public discussion. It is a vital procedure in quantum key distribution (QKD) to produce a theoretically unconditional secure key. The throughput of PA has become a bottleneck of the high-speed discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD) system. In this paper, a high-speed modular arithmetic hash PA scheme with GNU multiple precision (GMP) arithmetic library is presented. This scheme is implemented on two different central processing unit (CPU) platforms. The experimental results demon-strate that the throughput of this scheme achieves 260Mbps on the block size of 10^6 and 140Mbps on the block size of 10^8. This is the highest-speed recorded PA scheme on CPU platform to the authors knowledge.
Global quantum communications will enable long-distance secure data transfer, networked distributed quantum information processing, and other entanglement-enabled technologies. Satellite quantum communication overcomes optical fibre range limitations, with the first realisations of satellite quantum key distribution (SatQKD) being rapidly developed. However, limited transmission times between satellite and ground station severely constrains the amount of secret key due to finite-block size effects. Here, we analyse these effects and the implications for system design and operation, utilising published results from the Micius satellite to construct an empirically-derived channel and system model for a trusted-node downlink employing efficient BB84 weak coherent pulse decoy states with optimised parameters. We quantify practical SatQKD performance limits and examine the effects of link efficiency, background light, source quality, and overpass geometries to estimate long-term key generation capacity. Our results may guide design and analysis of future missions, and establish performance benchmarks for both sources and detectors.
The FPGA-based Quantum key distribution (QKD) system is an important trend of QKD systems. It has several advantages, real time, low power consumption and high integration density. Privacy amplification is an essential part in a QKD system to ensure the security of QKD. Existing FPGA-based privacy amplification schemes have an disadvantage, that the throughput and the input size of these schemes (the best scheme 116Mbps@10^6) are much lower than these on other platforms (the best scheme 1Gbps@10^8). This paper designs a new PA scheme for FPGA-based QKD with multilinear modular hash-modular arithmetic hash (MMH-MH) PA and number theoretical transform (NTT) algorithm. The new PA scheme, named large-scale and high-speed (LSHS) PA scheme, designs a multiplication-reusable architecture and three key units to improve the performance. This scheme improves the input size and throughput of PA by above an order of magnitude. The throughput and input size of this scheme (1Gbps@10^8) is at a comparable level with these on other platforms.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) removes all detector side channels and enables secure QKD with an untrusted relay. It is suitable for building a star-type quantum access network, where the complicated and expensive measurement devices are placed in the central untrusted relay and each user requires only a low-cost transmitter, such as an integrated photonic chip. Here, we experimentally demonstrate a 1.25 GHz silicon photonic chip-based MDI-QKD system using polarization encoding. The photonic chip transmitters integrate the necessary encoding components for a standard QKD source. We implement random modulations of polarization states and decoy intensities, and demonstrate a finite-key secret rate of 31 bps over 36 dB channel loss (or 180 km standard fiber). This key rate is higher than state-of-the-art MDI-QKD experiments. The results show that silicon photonic chip-based MDI-QKD, benefiting from miniaturization, low-cost manufacture and compatibility with CMOS microelectronics, is a promising solution for future quantum secure networks.
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the quantum state used to establish each bit never leaves the transmitting side, which hinders some attacks. We show how to adapt detector blinding attacks to this setting. In blinding attacks, gated avalanche photodiode detectors are disabled or forced to activate using bright light pulses. We present two attacks that use this ability to compromise the security of counterfactual quantum key distribution. The first is a general attack but technologically demanding (the attacker must be able to reduce the channel loss by half). The second attack could be deployed with easily accessible technology and works for implementations where single photon sources are approximated by attenuated coherent states. The attack is a combination of a photon number splitting attack and the first blinding attack which could be deployed with easily accessible technology. The proposed attacks show counterfactual quantum key distribution is vulnerable to detector blinding and that experimental implementations should include explicit countermeasures against it.
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