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Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often socially suboptimal. Society, therefore, has to pay a price of anarchy for the lack of coordination among its members. Here we assess this price of anarchy by analyzing the travel times in road networks of several major cities. Our simulation shows that uncoordinated drivers possibly waste a considerable amount of their travel time. Counterintuitively,simply blocking certain streets can partially improve the traffic conditions. We analyze various complex networks and discuss the possibility of similar paradoxes in physics.
In this paper, we analyze a transportation game first introduced by Fotakis, Gourv`es, and Monnot in 2017, where players want to be transported to a common destination as quickly as possible and, in order to achieve this goal, they have to choose one
In this paper we aim to demonstrate how physical perspective enriches usual statistical analysis when dealing with a complex system of many interacting agents of non-physical origin. To this end, we discuss analysis of urban public transportation net
The controllability of a network is a theoretical problem of relevance in a variety of contexts ranging from financial markets to the brain. Until now, network controllability has been characterized only on isolated networks, while the vast majority
We introduce the concept of control centrality to quantify the ability of a single node to control a directed weighted network. We calculate the distribution of control centrality for several real networks and find that it is mainly determined by the
A new public conveyance model applicable to buses and trains is proposed in this paper by using stochastic cellular automaton. We have found the optimal density of vehicles, at which the average velocity becomes maximum, significantly depends on the