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تسجيل مستخدم جديدSystematic Mutation-based Evaluation of the Soundness of Security-focused Android Static Analysis Techniques
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Mobile application security has been a major area of focus for security research over the course of the last decade. Numerous application analysis tools have been proposed in response to malicious, curious, or vulnerable apps. However, existing tools, and specifically, static analysis tools, trade soundness of the analysis for precision and performance and are hence soundy. Unfortunately, the specific unsound choices or flaws in the design of these tools is often not known or well-documented, leading to misplaced confidence among researchers, developers, and users. This paper describes the Mutation-based Soundness Evaluation ($mu$SE) framework, which systematically evaluates Android static analysis tools to discover, document, and fix flaws, by leveraging the well-founded practice of mutation analysis. We implemented $mu$SE and applied it to a set of prominent Android static analysis tools that detect private data leaks in apps. In a study conducted previously, we used $mu$SE to discover $13$ previously undocumented flaws in FlowDroid, one of the most prominent data leak detectors for Android apps. Moreover, we discovered that flaws also propagated to other tools that build upon the design or implementation of FlowDroid or its components. This paper substantially extends our $mu$SE framework and offers an new in-depth analysis of two more major tools in our 2020 study, we find $12$ new, undocumented flaws and demonstrate that all $25$ flaws are found in more than one tool, regardless of any inheritance-relation among the tools. Our results motivate the need for systematic discovery and documentation of unsound choices in soundy tools and demonstrate the opportunities in leveraging mutation testing in achieving this goal.
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Mobile application security has been one of the major areas of security research in the last decade. Numerous application analysis tools have been proposed in response to malicious, curious, or vulnerable apps. However, existing tools, and specifical
ly, static analysis tools, trade soundness of the analysis for precision and performance, and are hence soundy. Unfortunately, the specific unsound choices or flaws in the design of these tools are often not known or well-documented, leading to a misplaced confidence among researchers, developers, and users. This paper proposes the Mutation-based soundness evaluation ($mu$SE) framework, which systematically evaluates Android static analysis tools to discover, document, and fix, flaws, by leveraging the well-founded practice of mutation analysis. We implement $mu$SE as a semi-automated framework, and apply it to a set of prominent Android static analysis tools that detect private data leaks in apps. As the result of an in-depth analysis of one of the major tools, we discover 13 undocumented flaws. More importantly, we discover that all 13 flaws propagate to tools that inherit the flawed tool. We successfully fix one of the flaws in cooperation with the tool developers. Our results motivate the urgent need for systematic discovery and documentation of unsound choices in soundy tools, and demonstrate the opportunities in leveraging mutation testing in achieving this goal.
This demo paper presents the technical details and usage scenarios of $mu$SE: a mutation-based tool for evaluating security-focused static analysis tools for Android. Mutation testing is generally used by software practitioners to assess the robustne
ss of a given test-suite. However, we leverage this technique to systematically evaluate static analysis tools and uncover and document soundness issues. $mu$SEs analysis has found 25 previously undocumented flaws in static data leak detection tools for Android. $mu$SE offers four mutation schemes, namely Reachability, Complex-reachability, TaintSink, and ScopeSink, which determine the locations of seeded mutants. Furthermore, the user can extend $mu$SE by customizing the API calls targeted by the mutation analysis. $mu$SE is also practical, as it makes use of filtering techniques based on compilation and execution criteria that reduces the number of ineffective mutations.
Third-party security apps are an integral part of the Android app ecosystem. Many users install them as an extra layer of protection for their devices. There are hundreds of such security apps, both free and paid in Google Play Store and some of them
are downloaded millions of times. By installing security apps, the smartphone users place a significant amount of trust towards the security companies who developed these apps, because a fully functional mobile security app requires access to many smartphone resources such as the storage, text messages and email, browser history, and information about other installed applications. Often these resources contain highly sensitive personal information. As such, it is essential to understand the mobile security apps ecosystem to assess whether is it indeed beneficial to install them. To this end, in this paper, we present the first empirical study of Android security apps. We analyse 100 Android security apps from multiple aspects such as metadata, static analysis, and dynamic analysis and presents insights to their operations and behaviours. Our results show that 20% of the security apps we studied potentially resell the data they collect from smartphones to third parties; in some cases, even without the user consent. Also, our experiments show that around 50% of the security apps fail to identify malware installed on a smartphone.
We propose a new test case prioritization technique that combines both mutation-based and diversity-based approaches. Our diversity-aware mutation-based technique relies on the notion of mutant distinguishment, which aims to distinguish one mutants b
ehavior from another, rather than from the original program. We empirically investigate the relative cost and effectiveness of the mutation-based prioritization techniques (i.e., using both the traditional mutant kill and the proposed mutant distinguishment) with 352 real faults and 553,477 developer-written test cases. The empirical evaluation considers both the traditional and the diversity-aware mutation criteria in various settings: single-objective greedy, hybrid, and multi-objective optimization. The results show that there is no single dominant technique across all the studied faults. To this end, rev{we we show when and the reason why each one of the mutation-based prioritization criteria performs poorly, using a graphical model called Mutant Distinguishment Graph (MDG) that demonstrates the distribution of the fault detecting test cases with respect to mutant kills and distinguishment.
The correct use of cryptography is central to ensuring data security in modern software systems. Hence, several academic and commercial static analysis tools have been developed for detecting and mitigating crypto-API misuse. While developers are opt
imistically adopting these crypto-API misuse detectors (or crypto-detectors) in their software development cycles, this momentum must be accompanied by a rigorous understanding of their effectiveness at finding crypto-API misuse in practice. This paper presents the MASC framework, which enables a systematic and data-driven evaluation of crypto-detectors using mutation testing. We ground MASC in a comprehensive view of the problem space by developing a data-driven taxonomy of existing crypto-API misuse, containing $105$ misuse cases organized among nine semantic clusters. We develop $12$ generalizable usage-based mutation operators and three mutation scopes that can expressively instantiate thousands of compilable variants of the misuse cases for thoroughly evaluating crypto-detectors. Using MASC, we evaluate nine major crypto-detectors and discover $19$ unique, undocumented flaws that severely impact the ability of crypto-detectors to discover misuses in practice. We conclude with a discussion on the diverse perspectives that influence the design of crypto-detectors and future directions towards building security-focused crypto-detectors by design.
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