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Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, in analogy to the established memory protection, to protect applications from information leakage through timing channels. Based on a recently-proposed implementation of time protection in the seL4 microkernel, we investigate how such an implementation could be formally proved to prevent timing channels. We postulate that this should be possible by reasoning about a highly abstracted representation of the shared hardware resources that cause timing channels.
Despite the attempts of well-designed anonymous communication tools to protect users from tracking or identification, flaws in surrounding software (such as web browsers) and mistakes in configuration may leak the users identity. We introduce Nymix,
It is possible to obtain a large Bayes Factor (BF) favoring the null hypothesis when both the null and alternative hypotheses have low likelihoods, and there are other hypotheses being ignored that are much more strongly supported by the data. As sam
Learning problems form an important category of computational tasks that generalizes many of the computations researchers apply to large real-life data sets. We ask: what concept classes can be learned privately, namely, by an algorithm whose output
Learning to solve diagrammatic reasoning (DR) can be a challenging but interesting problem to the computer vision research community. It is believed that next generation pattern recognition applications should be able to simulate human brain to under
Consensus methods are widely used for combining phylogenetic trees into a single estimate of the evolutionary tree for a group of species. As more taxa are added, the new source trees may begin to tell a different evolutionary story when restricted t