اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدEquivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms
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تأليف
Jan Christoph Schlegel
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We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that equivalence, properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds.
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