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This paper describes a formalization of agent-based models (ABMs) as random walks on regular graphs and relates the symmetry group of those graphs to a coarse-graining of the ABM that is still Markovian. An ABM in which $N$ agents can be in $delta$ different states leads to a Markov chain with $delta^N$ states. In ABMs with a sequential update scheme by which one agent is chosen to update its state at a time, transitions are only allowed between system configurations that differ with respect to a single agent. This characterizes ABMs as random walks on regular graphs. The non-trivial automorphisms of those graphs make visible the dynamical symmetries that an ABM gives rise to because sets of micro configurations can be interchanged without changing the probability structure of the random walk. This allows for a systematic loss-less reduction of the state space of the model.
Collective or group intelligence is manifested in the fact that a team of cooperating agents can solve problems more efficiently than when those agents work in isolation. Although cooperation is, in general, a successful problem solving strategy, it
While simulations have been utilized in diverse domains, such as urban growth modeling, market dynamics modeling, etc; some of these applications may require validations based upon some real-world observations modeled in the simulation, as well. This
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