اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدExact and asymptotic solutions of the call auction problem
110
0
0.0
(
0
)
تأليف
Ioane Muni Toke
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
The call auction is a widely used trading mechanism, especially during the opening and closing periods of financial markets. In this paper, we study a standard call auction problem where orders are submitted according to Poisson processes, with random prices distributed according to a general distribution, and may be cancelled at any time. We compute the analytical expressions of the distributions of the traded volume, of the lower and upper bounds of the clearing prices, and of the price range of these possible clearing prices of the call auction. Using results from the theory of order statistics and a theorem on the limit of sequences of random variables with independent random indices, we derive the weak limits of all these distributions. In this setting, traded volume and bounds of the clearing prices are found to be asymptotically normal, while the clearing price range is asymptotically exponential. All the parameters of these distributions are explicitly derived as functions of the parameters of the incoming orders flows.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
We study a mathematical model capturing the support/resistance line method (a technique in technical analysis) where the underlying stock price transitions between two states of nature in a path-dependent manner. For optimal stopping problems with re
spect to a general class of reward functions and dynamics, using probabilistic methods, we show that the value function is $C^1$ and solves a general free boundary problem. Moreover, for a wide range of utilities, we prove that the best time to buy and sell the stock is obtained by solving free boundary problems corresponding to two linked optimal stopping problems. We use this to numerically compute optimal trading strategies for several types of dynamics and varying degrees of relative risk aversion. We then compare the strategies with the standard trading rule to investigate the viability of this form of technical analysis.
Latency (i.e., time delay) in electronic markets affects the efficacy of liquidity taking strategies. During the time liquidity takers process information and send marketable limit orders (MLOs) to the exchange, the limit order book (LOB) might under
go updates, so there is no guarantee that MLOs are filled. We develop a latency-optimal trading strategy that improves the marksmanship of liquidity takers. The interaction between the LOB and MLOs is modelled as a marked point process. Each MLO specifies a price limit so the order can receive worse prices and quantities than those the liquidity taker targets if the updates in the LOB are against the interest of the trader. In our model, the liquidity taker balances the tradeoff between missing trades and the costs of walking the book. We employ techniques of variational analysis to obtain the optimal price limit of each MLO the agent sends. The price limit of a MLO is characterized as the solution to a new class of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) driven by random measures. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the FBSDE and numerically solve it to illustrate the performance of the latency-optimal strategies.
We develop the optimal trading strategy for a foreign exchange (FX) broker who must liquidate a large position in an illiquid currency pair. To maximize revenues, the broker considers trading in a currency triplet which consists of the illiquid pair
and two other liquid currency pairs. The liquid pairs in the triplet are chosen so that one of the pairs is redundant. The broker is risk-neutral and accounts for model ambiguity in the FX rates to make her strategy robust to model misspecification. When the broker is ambiguity neutral (averse) the trading strategy in each pair is independent (dependent) of the inventory in the other two pairs in the triplet. We employ simulations to illustrate how the robust strategies perform. For a range of ambiguity aversion parameters, we find the mean Profit and Loss (P&L) of the strategy increases and the standard deviation of the P&L decreases as ambiguity aversion increases.
Executing a basket of co-integrated assets is an important task facing investors. Here, we show how to do this accounting for the informational advantage gained from assets within and outside the basket, as well as for the permanent price impact of m
arket orders (MOs) from all market participants, and the temporary impact that the agents MOs have on prices. The execution problem is posed as an optimal stochastic control problem and we demonstrate that, under some mild conditions, the value function admits a closed-form solution, and prove a verification theorem. Furthermore, we use data of five stocks traded in the Nasdaq exchange to estimate the model parameters and use simulations to illustrate the performance of the strategy. As an example, the agent liquidates a portfolio consisting of shares in Intel Corporation (INTC) and Market Vectors Semiconductor ETF (SMH). We show that including the information provided by three additional assets, FARO Technologies (FARO), NetApp (NTAP) and Oracle Corporation (ORCL), considerably improves the strategys performance; for the portfolio we execute, it outperforms the multi-asset version of Almgren-Chriss by approximately 4 to 4.5 basis points.
We examine the Foreign Exchange (FX) spot price spreads with and without Last Look on the transaction. We assume that brokers are risk-neutral and they quote spreads so that losses to latency arbitrageurs (LAs) are recovered from other traders in the
FX market. These losses are reduced if the broker can reject, ex-post, loss-making trades by enforcing the Last Look option which is a feature of some trading venues in FX markets. For a given rejection threshold the risk-neutral broker quotes a spread to the market so that her expected profits are zero. When there is only one venue, we find that the Last Look option reduces quoted spreads. If there are two venues we show that the market reaches an equilibrium where traders have no incentive to migrate. The equilibrium can be reached with both venues coexisting, or with only one venue surviving. Moreover, when one venue enforces Last Look and the other one does not, counterintuitively, it may be the case that the Last Look venue quotes larger spreads.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
