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We consider the problem of designing a survey to aggregate non-verifiable information from a privacy-sensitive population: an analyst wants to compute some aggregate statistic from the private bits held by each member of a population, but cannot verify the correctness of the bits reported by participants in his survey. Individuals in the population are strategic agents with a cost for privacy, ie, they not only account for the payments they expect to receive from the mechanism, but also their privacy costs from any information revealed about them by the mechanisms outcome---the computed statistic as well as the payments---to determine their utilities. How can the analyst design payments to obtain an accurate estimate of the population statistic when individuals strategically decide both whether to participate and whether to truthfully report their sensitive information? We design a differentially private peer-prediction mechanism that supports accurate estimation of the population statistic as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in settings where agents have explicit preferences for privacy. The mechanism requires knowledge of the marginal prior distribution on bits $b_i$, but does not need full knowledge of the marginal distribution on the costs $c_i$, instead requiring only an approximate upper bound. Our mechanism guarantees $epsilon$-differential privacy to each agent $i$ against any adversary who can observe the statistical estimate output by the mechanism, as well as the payments made to the $n-1$ other agents $j eq i$. Finally, we show that with slightly more structured assumptions on the privacy cost functions of each agent, the cost of running the survey goes to $0$ as the number of agents diverges.
We study private synthetic data generation for query release, where the goal is to construct a sanitized version of a sensitive dataset, subject to differential privacy, that approximately preserves the answers to a large collection of statistical qu
We consider a model where an agent has a repeated decision to make and wishes to maximize their total payoff. Payoffs are influenced by an action taken by the agent, but also an unknown state of the world that evolves over time. Before choosing an ac
We study stochastic convex optimization with heavy-tailed data under the constraint of differential privacy. Most prior work on this problem is restricted to the case where the loss function is Lipschitz. Instead, as introduced by Wang, Xiao, Devadas
Common datasets have the form of elements with keys (e.g., transactions and products) and the goal is to perform analytics on the aggregated form of key and frequency pairs. A weighted sample of keys by (a function of) frequency is a highly versatile
Correlation clustering is a widely used technique in unsupervised machine learning. Motivated by applications where individual privacy is a concern, we initiate the study of differentially private correlation clustering. We propose an algorithm that