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We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and quantum physics. A key created that way can then be used to transmit secure messages such that their security is also unaffected in the future.
We prove the security of the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chaus proof of
Coherent-one-way quantum key distribution (COW-QKD), possessing the simple experimental setup and the ability against the photon-number-splitting attack, has been implemented in various experiments and commercial applications. However, recent works h
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables unconditionally secure communication between distinct parties using a quantum channel and an authentic public channel. Reducing the portion of quantum-generated secret keys, that is consumed during the authentic
Terahertz (THz) communication is a topic of much research in the context of high-capacity next-generation wireless networks. Quantum communication is also a topic of intensive research, most recently in the context of space-based deployments. In this
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the first quantum information task to reach the level of mature technology, already fit for commercialization. It aims at the creation of a secret key between authorized partners connected by a quantum channel and a