Gradient-based training in federated learning is known to be vulnerable to faulty/malicious worker nodes, which are often modeled as Byzantine clients. Previous work either makes use of auxiliary data at parameter server to verify the received gradients or leverages statistic-based methods to identify and remove malicious gradients from Byzantine clients. In this paper, we acknowledge that auxiliary data may not always be available in practice and focus on the statistic-based approach. However, recent work on model poisoning attacks have shown that well-crafted attacks can circumvent most of existing median- and distance-based statistical defense methods, making malicious gradients indistinguishable from honest ones. To tackle this challenge, we show that the element-wise sign of gradient vector can provide valuable insight in detecting model poisoning attacks. Based on our theoretical analysis of state-of-the-art attack, we propose a novel approach, textit{SignGuard}, to enable Byzantine-robust federated learning through collaborative malicious gradient filtering. More precisely, the received gradients are first processed to generate relevant magnitude, sign, and similarity statistics, which are then collaboratively utilized by multiple, parallel filters to eliminate malicious gradients before final aggregation. We further provide theoretical analysis of SignGuard by quantifying its convergence with appropriate choice of learning rate and under non-IID training data. Finally, extensive experiments of image and text classification tasks - including MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and AG-News - are conducted together with recently proposed attacks and defense strategies. The numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our proposed approach.
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