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تسجيل مستخدم جديدVivienne: Relational Verification of Cryptographic Implementations in WebAssembly
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نشر من قبل
Rodothea Myrsini Tsoupidi
تاريخ النشر
2021
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الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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This paper explores the use of relational symbolic execution to counter timing side channels in WebAssembly programs. We design and implement Vivienne, an open-source tool to automatically analyze WebAssembly cryptographic libraries for constant-time violations. Our approach features various optimizations that leverage the structure of WebAssembly and automated theorem provers, including support for loops via relational invariants. We evaluate Vivienne on 57 real-world cryptographic implementations, including a previously unverified implementation of the HACL* library in WebAssembly. The results indicate that Vivienne is a practical solution for constant-time analysis of cryptographic libraries in WebAssembly.
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