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تسجيل مستخدم جديدA reply to Rovellis response to our Assessing Relational Quantum Mechanics
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In a recent paper, Rovelli responds to our critical assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). His main argument is that our assessment lacks merit, because we fail to understand, or cope with, the premises of his theory; instead, he argues, we judge his proposal, blinded by the preconceptions inherent to ``our camp. Here, we explicitly show that our assessment judges RQM on its own terms, together with the basic requirements of precision, clarity, logical soundness and empirical suitability. Under those circumstances, we prove false Rovellis claim that RQM provides a satisfactory, realistic, non-solipsistic description of the world. Moreover, his reply serves us to further exhibit the serious problems of the RQM proposal, as well as the failures of its author to understanding the basic conceptual difficulties of quantum theory.
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Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) is a non-standard interpretation of quantum theory based on the idea of abolishing the notion of absolute states of systems, in favor of states of systems relative to other systems. Such a move is claimed to solve t
he conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, RQM has been argued to account for all quantum correlations without invoking non-local effects and, in spite of embracing a fully relational stance, to successfully explain how different observers exchange information. In this work, we carry out a thorough assessment of RQM and its purported achievements. We find that it fails to address the conceptual problems of standard quantum mechanics, and that it leads to serious conceptual problems of its own. We also uncover as unwarranted the claims that RQM can correctly explain information exchange among observers, and that it accommodates all quantum correlations without invoking non-local influences. We conclude that RQM is unsuccessful in its attempt to provide a satisfactory understanding of the quantum world.
We present a derivation of the third postulate of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) from the properties of conditional probabilities.The first two RQM postulates are based on the information that can be extracted from interaction of different system
s, and the third postulate defines the properties of the probability function. Here we demonstrate that from a rigorous definition of the conditional probability for the possible outcomes of different measurements, the third postulate is unnecessary and the Borns rule naturally emerges from the first two postulates by applying the Gleasons theorem. We demonstrate in addition that the probability function is uniquely defined for classical and quantum phenomena. The presence or not of interference terms is demonstrated to be related to the precise formulation of the conditional probability where distributive property on its arguments cannot be taken for granted. In the particular case of Youngs slits experiment, the two possible argument formulations correspond to the possibility or not to determine the particle passage through a particular path.
The subjective Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics (QBism) and Rovellis relational interpretation of quantum mechanics (RQM) are both notable for embracing the radical idea that measurement outcomes correspond to events whose occurrence (or
not) is relative to an observer. Here we provide a detailed study of their similarities and especially their differences.
Yes. That is my polemical reply to the titular question in Travis Norsens self-styled polemical response to Howard Wisemans recent paper. Less polemically, I am pleased to see that on two of my positions --- that Bells 1964 theorem is different from
Bells 1976 theorem, and that the former does not include Bells one-paragraph heuristic presentation of the EPR argument --- Norsen has made significant concessions. In his response, Norsen admits that Bells recapitulation of the EPR argument in [the relevant] paragraph leaves something to be desired, that it disappoints and is problematic. Moreover, Norsen makes other statements that imply, on the face of it, that he should have no objections to the title of my recent paper (The Two Bells Theorems of John Bell). My principle aim in writing that paper was to try to bridge the gap between two interpretational camps, whom I call operationalists and realists, by pointing out that they use the phrase Bells theorem to mean different things: his 1964 theorem (assuming locality and determinism) and his 1976 theorem (assuming local causality), respectively. Thus, it is heartening that at least one person from one side has taken one step on my bridge. That said, there are several issues of contention with Norsen, which we (the two authors) address after discussing the extent of our agreement with Norsen. The most significant issues are: the indefiniteness of the word locality prior to 1964; and the assumptions Einstein made in the paper quoted by Bell in 1964 and their relation to Bells theorem.
A modified version of relational quantum mechanics is developed based on the three following ideas. An observer can develop an internally consistent description of the universe but it will, of necessity, differ in particulars from the description dev
eloped by any other observer. The state vector is epistomological and relative to a given quantum system as in the original relational quantum mechanics. If two quantum systems are entangled, they will observe themselves to be in just one of the many states in the Schmidt biorthonormal decomposition and not in a linear combination of many.
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