Attestation is a strong tool to verify the integrity of an untrusted system. However, in recent years, different attacks have appeared that are able to mislead the attestation process with treacherous practices as memory copy, proxy and rootkit attacks, just to name a few. A successful attack leads to systems that are considered trusted by a verifier system, while the prover has bypassed the challenge. To harden these attacks against attestation methods and protocols, some proposals have considered the use of side-channel information that can be measured externally, as it is the case of electromagnetic (EM) emanation. Nonetheless, these methods require the physical proximity of an external setup to capture the EM radiation. In this paper, we present the possibility of performing attestation by using the side channel information captured by a sensor or peripheral that lives in the same System-on-Chip (SoC) than the processor system (PS) which executes the operation that we aim to attest, by only sharing the Power Distribution Network (PDN). In our case, an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) that captures the voltage fluctuations at its input terminal while a certain operation is taking place is suitable to characterize itself and to distinguish it from other binaries. The resultant power traces are enough to clearly identify a given operation without the requirement of physical proximity.
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