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تسجيل مستخدم جديدImpact of EV Charging Stations in Power Grids in Italy and its Mitigation Mechanisms
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Global warming leads the world to think of a different way of transportation: avoiding internal combustion engines and electrifying the transportation sector. With a high penetration of electric vehicle (EV) charging stations on an existing power distribution network, the impact may be consistent. The loads of the fast-charging stations would potentially result in increased peak load demand, reduced reserve margins, voltage instability, and reliability problems. The degrading performance of the power system due to the negative impact of the EV charging stations can even lead to penalties to be paid by the distribution system operator (DSO). This paper: i) investigates the impact of the ac{ev} charging station on the distribution network for what concerns voltage drop on MV feeders and loading of transformers in primary substations, and ii) proposes a mitigation mechanism. A realistic typical Italian grid has been used to assess the impact of EV charging stations and to validate the mitigation mechanism.
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