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تسجيل مستخدم جديدCybersecurity of Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems: A Review
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Industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs) manage critical infrastructures by controlling the processes based on the physics data gathered by edge sensor networks. Recent innovations in ubiquitous computing and communication technologies have prompted the rapid integration of highly interconnected systems to ICPSs. Hence, the security by obscurity principle provided by air-gapping is no longer followed. As the interconnectivity in ICPSs increases, so does the attack surface. Industrial vulnerability assessment reports have shown that a variety of new vulnerabilities have occurred due to this transition while the most common ones are related to weak boundary protection. Although there are existing surveys in this context, very little is mentioned regarding these reports. This paper bridges this gap by defining and reviewing ICPSs from a cybersecurity perspective. In particular, multi-dimensional adaptive attack taxonomy is presented and utilized for evaluating real-life ICPS cyber incidents. We also identify the general shortcomings and highlight the points that cause a gap in existing literature while defining future research directions.
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