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تسجيل مستخدم جديدOscillatory dynamics in the dilemma of social distancing
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Social distancing as one of the main non-pharmaceutical interventions can help slow down the spread of diseases, like in the COVID-19 pandemic. Effective social distancing, unless enforced as drastic lockdowns and mandatory cordon sanitaire, requires consistent strict collective adherence. However, it remains unknown what the determinants for the resultant compliance of social distancing and their impact on disease mitigation are. Here, we incorporate into the epidemiological process with an evolutionary game theory model that governs the evolution of social distancing behavior. In our model, we assume an individual acts in their best interest and their decisions are driven by adaptive social learning of the real-time risk of infection in comparison with the cost of social distancing. We find interesting oscillatory dynamics of social distancing accompanied with waves of infection. Moreover, the oscillatory dynamics are dampened with a nontrivial dependence on model parameters governing decision-makings and gradually cease when the cumulative infections exceed the herd immunity. Compared to the scenario without social distancing, we quantify the degree to which social distancing mitigates the epidemic and its dependence on individuals responsiveness and rationality in their behavior changes. Our work offers new insights into leveraging human behavior in support of pandemic response.
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