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تسجيل مستخدم جديدImperfect Oracles: The Effect of Strategic Information on Stock Markets
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Modern financial market dynamics warrant detailed analysis due to their significant impact on the world. This, however, often proves intractable; massive numbers of agents, strategies and their change over time in reaction to each other leads to difficulties in both theoretical and simulational approaches. Notable work has been done on strategy dominance in stock markets with respect to the ratios of agents with certain strategies. Perfect knowledge of the strategies employed could then put an individual agent at a consistent trading advantage. This research reports the effects of imperfect oracles on the system - dispensing noisy information about strategies - information which would normally be hidden from market participants. The effect and achievable profits of a singular trader with access to an oracle were tested exhaustively with previously unexplored factors such as changing order schedules. Additionally, the effect of noise on strategic information was traced through its effect on trader efficiency.
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