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We study a security threat to reinforcement learning where an attacker poisons the learning environment to force the agent into executing a target policy chosen by the attacker. As a victim, we consider RL agents whose objective is to find a policy that maximizes reward in infinite-horizon problem settings. The attacker can manipulate the rewards and the transition dynamics in the learning environment at training-time, and is interested in doing so in a stealthy manner. We propose an optimization framework for finding an optimal stealthy attack for different measures of attack cost. We provide lower/upper bounds on the attack cost, and instantiate our attacks in two settings: (i) an offline setting where the agent is doing planning in the poisoned environment, and (ii) an online setting where the agent is learning a policy with poisoned feedback. Our results show that the attacker can easily succeed in teaching any target policy to the victim under mild conditions and highlight a significant security threat to reinforcement learning agents in practice.
In reward-poisoning attacks against reinforcement learning (RL), an attacker can perturb the environment reward $r_t$ into $r_t+delta_t$ at each step, with the goal of forcing the RL agent to learn a nefarious policy. We categorize such attacks by th
We study black-box reward poisoning attacks against reinforcement learning (RL), in which an adversary aims to manipulate the rewards to mislead a sequence of RL agents with unknown algorithms to learn a nefarious policy in an environment unknown to
As machine learning systems grow in scale, so do their training data requirements, forcing practitioners to automate and outsource the curation of training data in order to achieve state-of-the-art performance. The absence of trustworthy human superv
This paper studies bandit algorithms under data poisoning attacks in a bounded reward setting. We consider a strong attacker model in which the attacker can observe both the selected actions and their corresponding rewards, and can contaminate the re
In a poisoning attack, an adversary with control over a small fraction of the training data attempts to select that data in a way that induces a corrupted model that misbehaves in favor of the adversary. We consider poisoning attacks against convex m