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The literature on dynamic discrete games often assumes that the conditional choice probabilities and the state transition probabilities are homogeneous across markets and over time. We refer to this as the homogeneity assumption in dynamic discrete games. This homogeneity assumption enables empirical studies to estimate the games structural parameters by pooling data from multiple markets and from many time periods. In this paper, we propose a hypothesis test to evaluate whether the homogeneity assumption holds in the data. Our hypothesis is the result of an approximate randomization test, implemented via a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. We show that our hypothesis test becomes valid as the (user-defined) number of MCMC draws diverges, for any fixed number of markets, time-periods, and players. We apply our test to the empirical study of the U.S. Portland cement industry in Ryan (2012).
We study testable implications of multiple equilibria in discrete games with incomplete information. Unlike de Paula and Tang (2012), we allow the players private signals to be correlated. In static games, we leverage independence of private types ac
In nonlinear panel data models, fixed effects methods are often criticized because they cannot identify average marginal effects (AMEs) in short panels. The common argument is that the identification of AMEs requires knowledge of the distribution of
We study the impact of weak identification in discrete choice models, and provide insights into the determinants of identification strength in these models. Using these insights, we propose a novel test that can consistently detect weak identificatio
According to the cosmological principle, galaxy cluster sizes and cluster densities, when averaged over sufficiently large volumes of space, are expected to be constant everywhere, except for a slow variation with look-back time (redshift). Thus, ave
We study the rise in the acceptability fiat money in a Kiyotaki-Wright economy by developing a method that can determine dynamic Nash equilibria for a class of search models with genuine heterogenous agents. We also address open issues regarding the