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تسجيل مستخدم جديدStructural Invariants for the Verification of Systems with Parameterized Architectures
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We consider parameterized concurrent systems consisting of a finite but unknown number of components, obtained by replicating a given set of finite state automata. Components communicate by executing atomic interactions whose participants update their states simultaneously. We introduce an interaction logic to specify both the type of interactions (e.g. rendez-vous, broadcast) and the topology of the system (e.g. pipeline, ring). The logic can be easily embedded in monadic second order logic of finitely many successors, and is therefore decidable. Proving safety properties of such a parameterized system, like deadlock freedom or mutual exclusion, requires to infer an inductive invariant that contains all reachable states of all system instances, and no unsafe state. We present a method to automatically synthesize inductive invariants directly from the formula describing the interactions, without costly fixed point iterations. We experimentally prove that this invariant is strong enough to verify safety properties of a large number of systems including textbook examples (dining philosophers, synchronization schemes), classical mutual exclusion algorithms, cache-coherence protocols and self-stabilization algorithms, for an arbitrary number of components.
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We consider concurrent systems consisting of a finite but unknown number of components, that are replicated instances of a given set of finite state automata. The components communicate by executing interactions which are simultaneous atomic state ch
anges of a set of components. We specify both the type of interactions (e.g. rendez-vous, broadcast) and the topology (i.e. architecture) of the system (e.g. pipeline, ring) via a decidable interaction logic, which is embedded in the classical weak sequential calculus of one successor (WS1S). Proving correctness of such system for safety properties, such as deadlock freedom or mutual exclusion, requires the inference of an inductive invariant that subsumes the set of reachable states and avoids the unsafe states. Our method synthesizes such invariants directly from the formula describing the interactions, without costly fixed point iterations. We applied our technique to the verification of several textbook examples, such as dining philosophers, mutual exclusion protocols and concurrent systems with preemption and priorities.
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