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EFX Exists for Three Agents

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 نشر من قبل Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury Mr.
 تاريخ النشر 2020
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Despite significant efforts by many researchers for several years, the existence of EFX allocations has not been settled beyond the simple case of two agents. In this paper, we show constructively that an EFX allocation always exists for three agents. Furthermore, we falsify the conjecture by Caragiannis et al. by showing an instance with three agents for which there is a partial EFX allocation (some items are not allocated) with higher Nash welfare than that of any complete EFX allocation.



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