The resurgence of measles is largely attributed to the decline in vaccine adoption and the increase in mobility. Although the vaccine for measles is readily available and highly successful, its current adoption is not adequate to prevent epidemics. Vaccine adoption is directly affected by individual vaccination decisions, and has a complex interplay with the spatial spread of disease shaped by an underlying mobility (travelling) network. In this paper, we model the travelling connectivity as a scale-free network, and investigate dependencies between the networks assortativity and the resultant epidemic and vaccination dynamics. In doing so we extend an SIR-network model with game-theoretic components, capturing the imitation dynamics under a voluntary vaccination scheme. Our results show a correlation between the epidemic dynamics and the networks assortativity, highlighting that networks with high assortativity tend to suppress epidemics under certain conditions. In highly assortative networks, the suppression is sustained producing an early convergence to equilibrium. In highly disassortative networks, however, the suppression effect diminishes over time due to scattering of non-vaccinating nodes, and frequent switching between the predominantly vaccinating and non-vaccinating phases of the dynamics.
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