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تسجيل مستخدم جديدMicroTEE: Designing TEE OS Based on the Microkernel Architecture
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ARM TrustZone technology is widely used to provide Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) for mobile devices. However, most TEE OSes are implemented as monolithic kernels. In such designs, device drivers, kernel services and kernel modules all run in the kernel, which results in large size of the kernel. It is difficult to guarantee that all components of the kernel have no security vulnerabilities in the monolithic kernel architecture, such as the integer overflow vulnerability in Qualcomm QSEE TrustZone and the TZDriver vulnerability in HUAWEI Hisilicon TEE architecture. This paper presents MicroTEE, a TEE OS based on the microkernel architecture. In MicroTEE, the microkernel provides strong isolation for TEE OSs basic services, such as crypto service and platform key management service. The kernel is only responsible for providing core services such as address space management, thread management, and inter-process communication. Other fundamental services, such as crypto service and platform key management service are implemented as applications at the user layer. Crypto Services and Key Management are used to provide Trusted Applications (TAs) with sensitive information encryption, data signing, and platform attestation functions. Our design avoids the compromise of the whole TEE OS if only one kernel service is vulnerable. A monitor has also been added to perform the switch between the secure world and the normal world. Finally, we implemented a MicroTEE prototype on the Freescale i.MX6Q Sabre Lite development board and tested its performance. Evaluation results show that the performance of cryptographic operations in MicroTEE is better than it in Linux when the size of data is small.
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